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CAN'T WE ALL GET ALONG?

The Case for a

Workable Patent Model
Srividhya Ragavan*

I.

INTRODUCTION

America and Canada made significant moves during the anthrax crisis to
ensure access to drugs by restricting the rights of patent holders. The
prevailing economic slump in the United States has resulted in policies
furthering generic drugs to the detriment of the patent holders. Issues of
economic crisis and public health that moved America towards the generic
industry are prevalent in the developing nations in a magnified manner. Yet
tighter patent regimes are advocated for these nations. The policies that
developed nations advocate have the inherent danger of extinguishing the
dream of a global trade regime.
Countries traditionally carve patent policies to complement
industrialization and trade by encouraging invention. The roots of patent
policies in the developed nations can be traced to the post-World War II era
when the focus shifted from war to trade.' Countries expanded beyond
national boundaries seeking superior trade and economic positions by
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1.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW § 1.3(e), at 23
(1998).
*
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investing and inventing. 2 By the end of the 1800s, nations realized that
poor patent policies could affect trade.3
This realization laid the foundation for intellectual property policies.4
The importance of international intellectual property policies was
highlighted when developed nations noted that the developing nations
distorted international trade.5 Industries from developed nations hesitated
to invest in developing nations due to those nations' poor patent policies.6
Policy experts canvassed for immediate and better intellectual property
protection, resulting in the birth of the philosophy leading to the Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") s agreement,
powered by the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). 9 This agreement was
the first step to facilitate free trade by requiring all nations to fall within a
uniform trade structure.10 The developing countries objected to the patent
2.
Id.
3.
Id. § 1.3(e)(2), at 26. Currently, different standards determine whether a country is
regarded as "developing." The United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development all use relatively different yardsticks in
making this determination. The term "developing nations" in this paper denotes the least
developed nations, such as Somalia, Ethiopia, and Tanzania.
4.
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 223 (last revised July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne
Convention]; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 1630, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, 307 (last revised July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris
Convention].
5.
See Robert Pechman, Seeking MultilateralProtection for Intellectual Property: The
United States "TRIPs " over Special 301, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 179, 181-82 (1998).
6.
Id. See also Anthony D. Sabatelli, Impediments to Global PatentLaw Harmonization,
22 N. Ky. L. REV. 579, 618-19 (1995) (discussing the benefits of strong intellectual property
rights); David Tomar, A Look into the WTO PharmaceuticalPatentDispute Between the United
States and India, 17 WIs. INT'L L.J. 579 (1999) (discussing India's resistance of the U.S. to
bring about a patent amendment).
7.
See Sabatelli, supra note 6, at 619; Evelyn Su, The Winners and Losers: The
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and its Effects on
Developing Countries, 23 Hous. J. INT'L L. 169, 177-178 (2000); see also Stefan Kirchanski,
Protection of the U.S. Patent Rights in Developing Countries: U.S. Efforts to Enforce
PharmaceuticalPatents in Thailand, 16 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV 569, 571 (1994)
(noting that developed countries believe a good patent system leads to economic growth);
Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual Property for Latin America: How Soon Will it Work?, 4
NAFTA L. & Bus. REV. AM. 77, 80 (1998), available at http://ns.kreative.net/ipbenefits/
iplatam/right.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2003) (discussing the stimulation of intellectual efforts).
8.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
9.
Id.
10. Id. The Preamble indicates a "desir[e] to reduce distortions and impediments to
international trade . . . [by] promot[ing] ... adequate protection of intellectual property rights,"
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policy in TRIPS, resulting in an escalating tension between the developing
and developed nations.II
Today, the economies of developing countries are destabilized by
unemployment, poverty, and political and financial instability.' 2 These
countries lack the basic infrastructure and the economic viability to
establish and support a sophisticated patent policy. This unfavorable
economic circumstance is an impediment to successful enforcement of
TRIPS-like patent policies. 13 Naturally, developing nations need to be wary
of the TRIPS patent regime, similar to the manner in which developed
nations mistrusted patents during the Great Depression and the World
Wars. 14 A completely different set of economic circumstances enabled the
genesis of a patent policy in the developed nations. 15 Forgetting those
circumstances, the developed nations now mistakenly believe that if
counterfeit products are curtailed, people will be forced to buy patented
products. Ignoring the individual difficulties of implementing nations is a
strategic mistake that can ultimately harm developed nations.
Undeniably, all countries should fall within the trade-oriented system of
the post-World Wars era economies. A good patent policy is a fundamental
requirement for movement toward a trade era. However, it is questionable
whether TRIPS is the best mechanism for the developing nations to join the
trade and intellectual property fraternity. Developed nations will be
adversely affected if developing nations subscribe to the TRIPS patent
policy without building a supporting infrastructure. The consequences may
potentially affect the post world war trade structure ("trade structure"). This
article discusses the impact of the current WTO patent policy on developed
nations and on the trade structure and distinguishes itself from other

and by promoting "standards and principles [for the] availability, scope and use of trade-related
intellectual property rights." Id. at 84.
11. Id. The Preamble acknowledges the underlying tension between developing and
developed nations and "emphasize[s] the importance of reducing tensions by reaching
strengthened commitments." Id.
12.

See generally PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS ix-xi, 155

(1999) (analyzing the world economic crisis originating in East Asia in 1997 as the return of
depression economics).
13. See Ruth Gana, Prospectsfor Developing Countries Under the TRIPs Agreement, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735, 770-71 (1996). Professor Gana contends that "it would be
wishful to assume that enforcement of the TRIPs Agreement will take place without some form
of internal resistance, however this is manifested." Id. She argues that developing countries
need to know "how to walk before [they can start] leap[ing]," which she contends is what is
expected under the TRIPS Agreement. Id.
14. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, § 1.3(e), at 23.
15. See infra Parts IIA-B.

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

contributions to this subject by focusing on the impact on developed
nations.
Parts II and III of this paper lay the theoretical foundations for the
detailed analysis which follows in parts IV and V. Part II traces the historic
circumstances fostering the development of patent policies in the developed
and developing nations. An understanding of the circumstances leading to a
specified path for patent policies in developed and developing nations
facilitates a fuller appreciation of part III, which discusses the pre-TRIPS
patent legislation of developing countries. India is used as a case study in
part III to discuss various areas where developing countries display unique
issues. The resistance of the Indian government to implement TRIPS and
the pressure under which amendments were made to the Indian patent
legislation to harmonize it with TRIPS is also discussed. This part
complements the discussions on the resistance of the Indians detailed in part
V.
Part IV discusses four issues that make the expectations from developing
nations to ease into a patent regime impractical. Even assuming developing
countries amend the patent legislation, implementation will be impossible.
Part IV further argues that developed nations chose policy options strikingly
similar to the pre-TRIPS patent policies of developing nations when faced
with similar economic and social issues.
Part V demonstrates how reactions of people in developing nations to
TRIPS patent policy will result in adverse consequences to developed
nations. Developed nations have already garnered enormous monetary and
strategic losses by attempting to establish the TRIPS patent policy in the
developing world. Continuing this strategy could affect the world trade
structure and may be detrimental to the developed nations.
This effort is intended to highlight factors that need to be accounted for
in order to fashion a realistic patent policy that is workable in developing
countries. The division between the developed and developing nations is
not about ideology, but about practicability. The impractical assessment of
the various factors led to the failure of the patent policy in critical areas.
TRIPS lacks sensitivity to local needs and realities. It neither takes account
of, nor provides any solutions to, issues that developing countries are bound
to face in implementing the treaty. Even the rich, patent friendly nations
have considered patent restricting options under economic crisis or under
threat to public health. Given this, developed nations posit a strategically
losing argument in forcing impoverished nations swamped by diseases to
embrace TRIPS. Developing nations will be unable to mirror patent
policies of developed nations without compromising on research and
development and negatively affecting the global trade regime.

35:0117]
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II.

THE DEVELOPMENT

To fully appreciate. patent policies, it is important to understand how they
evolved historically. Economic gains were the main motive for the
development of pateni policies. Whenever an economic or public health
crisis emerged, the patent policies were subjected to state power. The
development of patent policies in the developed nations and the emergence
of the international patent policy are traced in the first two sections. The
last section, Patent Fallacy in Developing Countries, discusses the
economic realities that fostered the development of a patent policy in the
developing nations.
A.

Patent Policy

Patent laws had a partial genesis in Venice in the early 1300s. 6 In 1323,
a German milling engineer, who undertook to build grain mills to satisfy the
storage needs of all of Venice, was granted the first known privilege for
approximately 80 ducats. 17 The first law providing the grant of exclusive
rights for a limited period as an economic policy to inventors evolved in
Venice in 1474.18 In 1488, the Statuto Minerariavested monopoly rights to
develop local industries. 19 During this period, the Venetian economy was
deteriorating because of a long war between Venice and Turkey. 20 Venice
had lost its trading empire in the Eastern Mediterranean. 2 1 The Statuto
22
Minerariawas drafted by Venice to focus on economic development. The
Venetian system influenced
the British, who pioneered the development of
23
early patent laws.

16. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, § 1.3(b)(1), at 9.
17. Id. at 10. The ducat was the prevailing currency of the time.
18. Id. at 10-11.
19. Id.
20. Ladas & Parry, A Brief History of Patent Law of the United States, at
http://www.ladas.com/Patents/USPatentHistory.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2003); see also
Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents
(Part I), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 697, 705-06 (1994) (discussing monopoly
grants to encourage new trade and industry).
21. Ladas & Parry, supra note 20; see also Walterscheid, supra note 20, at 710.
22. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 11; Ladas & Parry, supra note 20 (discussing the
history of early Venetian patent law).
23. Walterscheid, supra note 20, at 706; see also Thomas M. Meshbesher, The Role of
History in Comparative Patent Law, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 594 (1996)
(discussing origins of European patent law).
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Patent Development in the United Kingdom

In England, patent law developed in the form of the crown's prerogative
to issue letters patent. 24 "Letters patent . . . bestow[ed] privileges upon
individuals in furtherance of royal policies., 25 Notably, these privileges
were designed not to increase trade, 26 but to "entic[e] tradesmen and
industrialists to [manufacture] in England., 27 King Edward III issued letters
patent to protect foreigners coming to England for the purpose of training
subjects in various trades. 28 Patents were granted to lure foreign industries
into England, thereby sustaining local industries and enabling Britain to
become self-sufficient. 29 Sir Walterscheid, in his extensive work, asserted
that Queen Elizabeth I made an effort "to stimulate domestic production of
both raw materials and a wide variety of manufactured goods previously
imported from abroad" by granting patents.30
However, creating monopoly rights in this way violated the principles of
the common law. 3 1 The State restrained trade in the best interest of the
nation, an action similar to the compulsory license Rprovisions of today. 32 In
1623, the Statute of Monopolies was codified.
This statute granted
statutory recognition and legal status for patents. 34 In 1752, patents in
England advanced from being a royal prerogative to a subject matter
adjudicated by common law courts. 35 The specification requirement
evolved in England during this time. 36 Various changes in the procedure for
obtaining patents were introduced in 1852, 1883, and 1888, although the

24.
1800, 52
25.
26.
27.
28.

Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History 1550HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1259 (2001).
Id.
Id. at 1259 n.15.
Id. at 1259; see also Walterscheid, supra note 20, at 700-01.
CHRISTINE

MACLEOD,

INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL

REVOLUTION:

THE ENGLISH

PATENT SYSTEM, 10, 1660-1800 (1988); see also Mossoff, supra note 24, at 1259 n.16.
29. Mossoff, supra note 24, at 1261-62.
30. Id. at 1261 (quoting Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States
PatentLaw: Antecedents (Part2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 849, 855 (1994)).
31. See id. at 1262.
32. See Jacob I. Corr6, The Argument, Decision, andReports of Darcy v. Allen, 45 EMORY
L.J. 1261, 1324-25 (1996) (analyzing the judgment in Darcy v. Allen, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260
(1603))
33. Id. at 1271. Starting with the famous case of Darcy v. Allen, Parliament and the
Crown were constantly at loggerheads over the grant of monopoly patents. Id. at 1267-70.
Conflicts continued until the early 1620s. Id. at 1270. This resulted in Parliament passing the
Statute of Monopolies in 1623. Id. at 1271.
34. Id. at 1272.
35. Id. at 1286.
36. Id. at 1289-90.
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common law rules still prevailed.37 It was not until the Patents and Designs
Act of 1932 that statutory grounds were first introduced. 38 The Patents Act
of 1949 abolished the common-law grounds, leaving the grant of patents to
be governed exclusively by statutory grounds. 39 In 1977, British patents
legislation underwent another major amendment.40 This led to the creation
of the patent courts. 41 Currently, the Patents Act of 1977, read with the
Patents Rules of 1995, regulates the substantive law and practice of patents
in the U.K. 42
2.

Patents in the United States

Both policymakers and the Supreme Court punctuated the development
of patent policy in the United States with objections. The origins of the
American patent system can be traced to 1641, 43 yet the right to a patent
was not introduced until the first draft of the Constitution in 1787. 44
Following this, the Patents Act was introduced in 1790, and was revised in
1793.45 Thomas Jefferson, the first Secretary of State and a strong believer
in the patent system, crafted the amendments to reiterate the importance of a

37.

WILLIAM ALDOUS ET AL., TERRELL ON THE LAW OF PATENTS 5

(1982).

38. David L. Cohen, Comment, Article 69 and European PatentIntegration, 92 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1082, 1098 (1998) (discussing modem British patent law).
39. Id.
40.

R.G.C.

JENKINS

&

Co.,

Patents

Act

1977,

at

http://www.Jenkins-

ip.com/patlaw/index.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2003). Most of the legislation came into
operation on June 1, 1978. Id.
41. The 1977 statute was divided into three parts. The first part, domestic patents, was
addressed under the title "New Domestic Law." The second part detailed the obligations under
international conventions and the final part dealt with the creation of the patent court. R.G.C.
JENKINS & Co., Patents Act 1977, at http://www.Jenkins-ip.com/patlaw/index.htm (last visited
Apr. 20, 2003).
42. See United Kingdom Statutory Instrument 1995 No. 2093, as amended. The act and
the rules are to be read with Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, and the European
Communities Act, 1972. UK Patent Law, Introduction, supra note 40.
43. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, § 1.3(c), at 13. The history of American patents
extends much further than the two hundred years since the Act of 1790. Nine of the thirteen
colonies of America granted rewards for inventors, although not all of them were similar to
modem-day patents. Id.
44. Id. § 1.3(c)(3), at 17. The first draft of the Constitution was introduced as the Virginia
Plan in 1787. Id. Charles Pinckney of the South Carolina Legislature proposed exclusive rights
for inventive activity. This was recommended to the Committee on Detail. Id. Pinckney also
served on the Committee on Detail. Thus, Pinckney became the source for the introduction of
the Patent Clause into the U.S. Constitution. Id.
45. Id. at 19.
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good patent policy.4 6 Despite Jefferson's encouragement, the depression

era beginning in 1873 resulted in a vigorous distrust of patents.47 Even the
48
Supreme Court construed patents as antitrust violations in several cases.
At the end of World War II in 1945, the United States gained world
economic leadership. 49 Trade -and commerce surged in the 1950s. 50
Consequently, patent reform was contemplated for the first time since
This resulted in the enactment of the lifeline of patents in the
1873.
in the form of the Patents Act of 1952.52
States
United
However, the enactment of the 1952 legislation did not solidify the
patent system. Instead, the subjectivity in the legislation contributed to
another decade of confusion in patent law. 53 The Supreme Court attempted
to cement the law through "The Trilogy"5 4 cases in 1966.5s The subjectivity
in the legislation was replaced by an objective test for non-obviousness to
decide patentability. 56 The cement gave way in 1969, causing more
confusion when another Supreme Court decision articulated the synergism
test.57 Finally, in 1982, Congress passed the Federal Court Improvements
Act, which established the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 58and
vested in it jurisdiction to hear patent appeals from U.S. District Courts.
After this period, American patent policy evolved as the most dynamic in
the world. The United States emerged as the forerunner in encouraging
46. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 147 (1989) (citation
omitted).
47. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, § 1.3(e), at 23 (maintaining that misplaced antitrust
priorities and subjective inventiveness tests were the causes for mistrust of patents).
48. See, e.g., Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1949); Cuno Eng'g
Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 90-92 (1941); Lincoln Eng'g Co. v. StewartWarner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 552 (1938); R.M. Hollingshead Co. v. Bassick Mfg. Co., 73 F.2d
543, 550 (6th Cir. 1934).
49. ADELMANETAL., supra note 1, § 1.3(e)(1), at 23-24.
50.

Id.

51. Id.at 24.
52. Id.
53. Id.

54. Id. § 7.1, at 417 (noting that the three cases were "of such importance to the patent bar
that they became known merely as 'The Trilogy.').
55. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12-19 (1966); United States v. Adams,
383 U.S. 39, 48-52 (1966). The third of the three cases known as "The Trilogy," CalmarInc. v.
Cook Chemical Co., was consolidated with Graham. Graham, 383 U.S. at 1.
56. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, § 1.3(e)(1), at 24.

57. See Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969)
(explaining the "synergism" test by stating that "[a] combination of elements may result in an
effect greater than the sum of the several effects taken separately").
58.

See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized

Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L.
Circuit).

REV.

1 (1989) (appraising the role of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
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61
patents in areas like chemical, 59 biotechnology, 60 business methods,
software, 62 and methods of medical treatment. 63 Patent law has been used
to commensurate industrial development such as in the biotech industry.
The seminal case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty64 paved the way for biotech
patents. Soon the United States became the only choice for future
investment of biotech companies. The development was so vast that
companies were scrambling for biotech patents. This led to several
65
innovations and inventions in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals.
Several European countries, including Germany and England, followed the
biotech patent trend.66
The British crafted the early development of patent policies, while the
Americans engineered the modem patent system. Both countries had two
advantages-recognition of the importance of a good patent system coupled
with the blessing of economic leadership. In spite of these advantages, it
took more than a century, from the 1800s until the mid-1900s, before a
sustainable patent policy was crystallized.

B.

PatentPrescription

Traditionally, the developed nations, headed by the United States, face
two major concerns in international trade. The first is the lack of minimum
standards enabling countries to set their own standards of intellectual
59. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528-36 (1966) (discussing the utility
requirement in chemical patents).
60. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980) (holding that a utility
patent can be granted for a human-made microorganism).
61. See, e.g., State Street Bank & Trust, Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998). This decision was reaffirmed by the Federal Circuit in AT&T Corp. v.
Excel Communications Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See also Heath W.
Hoglund, InternetPatents Enter the FederalCourts, FROM THE BAR, Vol. 26 (2000) (discussing
the effects of State Street Bank & Trust on internet patents), available at http://www.
hhoglund.com/FedBarl.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
62. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185-87 (1981).
63. See generally Gregory F. Burch, Ethical Considerationsin the Patentingof Medical
Processes, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1139, 1146 (1987) (discussing the development of patent law in
methods of medical treatment).
64. 447 U.S. 303, 316-17 (1980).
65. Although biotechnology patents were not the only reason, biotechnology patents were
a distinguishing feature that made the United States an attractive place for biotechnology
investments.
66. See generally Geertrui Van Overwalle, Patent Protectionfor Plants:A Comparison of
American and European Approaches, 39 J.L. & TECH. 143 (1999).
The German
Bundesgerichtshof(federal supreme court) was the first non-American court to deal with issues
relating to biotech patents. However, it was only after the Chakrabartydecision that Europe
began to encourage biotech patenting. Id.
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property protection.6 7 The second is the inadequacy of the international
enforcement mechanism to check the deviant nations. 68 The United States
conventionally relied on unilateral measures such as section 182 of the
7
Omnibus Trade Act of 1974,69 "commonly referred to as 'Special 301,, 0
for enforcement of intellectual property rights. The United States identified
countries with inadequate protection of intellectual property rights and
encouraged them to amend their practices. 7 1 Those who did not amend their
practices were subject to Special 301 trade sanctions. 72 However, the
Special 301 actions extended beyond the time frame contemplated by the
United States. 73 There was no guarantee that a country coerced by trade
sanctions under Special 301 would eventually enforce intellectual property
rights effectively. Additionally, other General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") members criticized the United States for using Special 301
and violating the spirit of GATT. 74 Thus, the need for an international
coalition was evident.
1. The TRIPS Agreement
The enactment of the TRIPS agreement 75 marked a renewed
international effort to control worldwide deterrence in intellectual property
policy. The Uruguay Round 76 of the GATT resulted from efforts of "over
one hundred years... to globally harmonize intellectual property rights. 77
67. Pechman, supra note 5, at 181-82.
68. Id.
69. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 182, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (1975) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2000)).
70. Pechman, supra note 5, at 196.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 198.
73. Id. (discussing that "none of the intellectual property cases under Special 301 [was]
satisfactorily resolved [within the prescribed] time frame of six to nine months").
74. Myles Getlan, TRIPs and the Future of Section 301: A Comparative Study in Trade
Dispute Resolution, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 173, 177 (1995).
75. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at 1.
76. During World War II, GATT was established in 1947 to encourage non-discriminatory
policies in international trade. Although GATT's role in international trade was considerable,
nations felt the need for a global trade organization. Thus, the WTO was established under a
multilateral agreement.
The WTO is the successor to GATT, but with wider objects and
functions. The multilateral trade negotiations at the Uruguay Round extended to investment,
agriculture, textiles (which were previously excluded from GATT), intellectual property rights,
and services. India is a member of the WTO and is obliged to follow TRIPS, which is an
agreement made under the WTO. See generally World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org
(last visited Feb. 17, 2003).
77. Pechman, supra note 5, at 180.
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"TRIPs negotiations were concluded [in 1994] as part of the Uruguay
Round of GATT and the agreement establishing the WTO. 78 TRIPS was
adopted in 1994.79 The TRIPS agreement was conceived to reduce
international trade distortions due to infringement
and misappropriation of
8°
nations.
developing
by
intellectual property
The TRIPS agreement establishes "minimum standards of intellectual
property protection" and creates an enforcement mechanism to deal with
81
infringement of intellectual property rights in international trade in goods.
The basic tenet of TRIPS, detailed in articles three through five, is a
principle of uniform treatment of nationals of all member states.82 The
"National Treatment" clause forbids discrimination in trade between the
member's own nationals and nationals of other members. 83 The "MostFavoured-Nation Treatment" clause84 forbids discrimination between the
nationals of other members in trade.
Part II of TRIPS specifies the minimum levels of substantive norms and
standards to be practiced by each member country. These norms define the
subject matter to be protected,85 the minimum duration of protection,86 the
rights to be conferred,87 and the permissible exceptions.88 The obligations
and standards of TRIPS are read with other World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") Conventions, which, in the case of patents, is the
Paris Convention. 89 TRIPS also provides for a dispute settlement body for
multilateral intellectual property disputes. 90
The dispute settlement
78.
79.

Id. at 183.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at 1.

80. M.K. Nawaz, Changing Structure of International Trade Law, WIPRO INFOTECH
HANDBOOK ON INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAW (1997) (on file with author).
81. See J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation
with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J.INT'L L. 441, 442 (2000) (discussing the

positive aspects of transitioning towards TRIPS and the negative trends affecting the transition).
82.

See J.H. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to a

Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 363, 366-74 (1996) (discussing the nature and
scope of the various intellectual properties within the TRIPS agreement).

83. TRIPS Agreement supra note 8, art 3.
84. Id. art. 4.
85. Id. art. 15.
86. Id. art. 18.
87. Id. art. 16.
88. Id. art. 17.
89. Paris Convention, supra note 4.
90. TRIPS agreement, supra note 8, arts. 63, 64. These articles comprise Part V, "Dispute
Prevention and Settlement," the mechanism that prevents and settles disputes. The developed
nations have been criticized for using the provisions to impose trade sanctions. See also Getlan,
supra note 74, at 217-18 (proposing that the United States abandon the use of section 301
against GATT members since use of the TRIPS dispute resolution mechanism for an intellectual
property case will yield similar results with greater benefits to the United States).
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mechanism facilitates consensus through consultation; 9 1 if the parties do not
settle, the dispute can be moved before a panel of arbitration. 92 The
concessions granted by TRIPS are embedded in the transitional provisions,
whereby members are not obliged to comply with the TRIPS Agreement for
a period of one year from the effective date of the agreement (April 1994).93
Article 65(2) allows developing countries another four years (five years in
total) to comply with the provisions of the agreement.94 Article 65(4)
provides the developin countries an additional five years to extend the
product patent regime. 9 The major advantage of the TRIPS agreement is
the mandatory enforcement provisions, 96 which include remedies and
deterrents to prevent derogation from the agreement.9 7 TRIPS embodies
civil and administrative procedures,
provisional measures, 99 special
10 0 and criminal procedures' 0 1
requirements relating to border measures,
applicable for right holders to effectively enforce rights.
The most controversial element of the TRIPS agreement relates to
provisions on the protection of patents. 1° 2 The term of patents is twenty
years from the date of the application. 10 3 TRIPS mandates patent protection
for "all fields of technology."' 1 4 Patent protection must be provided for all
inventions that are "new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of
industrial application."' 0 5 Developing nations objected that the economic
conditions of these nations hindered their embracing the patent regime
contemplated under TRIPS.
91. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 64.
92. See id. Article 64 provides for dispute settlement through articles 22 and 23 of GATT,
read in conjunction with the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M.
1226, 1240 (1994) [hereinafter the Understanding]. Article 6 of the Understanding provides for
the establishment of a panel at the request of the complaining party. Id. art. 6.
93. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 65(1).
94. Id. art. 65(2).
95. Id. art. 65(4).
96. One of the major criticisms against the Paris Convention was the absence of remedial
measures.
97. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 41.
98. Id. arts. 42-49.
99. Id. art. 50.
100. Id. art. 57.
101. Id. art. 61.
102. Shondeep Banerji, The Indian Intellectual Property Rights Regime and the TRIPs
Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EMERGING MARKETS 47, 57 (Clarisa Long
ed., 2000).
103. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 33.
104. Id. art. 27.
105. Id.
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C.

PatentFallacy in Developing Countries

India and Brazil provide useful examples to highlight how local needs
shape the course for developing countries in choosing policy options. For
example, when the Indian government drafted the first five-year plan to
carve India's development path from 1951 through 1956, India had the
"largest reservoir of ... epidemic diseases.'' 1 6 Epidemic diseases in India
accounted for 5.1% of the total deaths. 1° 7 Poverty was at its peak,'1 8 with
around half of India's population living below the poverty line and unable
to afford drugs. 109 Consequently, life expectancy was low and the mortality
rate due to diseases was high. A brief overview of Brazil highlights a
similar picture where poverty and health care affect a country's patent
policies.
1. India in the Middle of a "Colonial Hangover"
The British granted India independence in 1947 but left the plundered
country suffering from poverty and poor health. India was left with the
singular option of prioritizing local issues ahead of development and
international trade issues. Although the East India Company opened the
first window to patent law in India during the colonial regime, the laws
accommodated only the needs of the colonial British Empire.
The first Indian patent law was enacted in 1856110 as a result of the
recommendations of the Lord Macaulay Law Commission.'11 This act and
106.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, PLANNING COMM'N OFF.

Doc.,

FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN,

(1951-56), (Vol. I & II) (Jan. 2002), available at http://www.planningcommission.nic.in/
plans/planrel/fiveyr/default.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
107. Id.
108. Income from industries was as low as a mere 6.6% of the gross annual national income
and only 8% of the total labor force was working in the industrial establishment. Id. ch. 29.
109. Press Release, The World Bank Group, India Shows Mixed Progress in the War
Against Poverty (Aug. 26, 1997), at http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/1449.htm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2003).
110. Srividhya Ragavan, Patent Amendments in India in the Wake of TRIPS, CASRIP
NEWSLETTER (Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law), Winter 2001, available at http://www.law.
washington.edu/casrip/newsletter/newsv8ilRagavan.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2003). This Act
was "modeled on the same lines as the British Patent Act of 1852." Id.
111. Lalit Sethi, Rarely Seen or HeardLaw Commission's Work Has Great Impact, Press
Information Bureau: Government of India (1991), at http://pib.nic.in/feature/fel199/
f2911991.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2003). The first Law Commission was established in 1834
under the Charter Act of 1833 and under the Chairmanship of Lord Macaulay. This
commission was responsible for the codification of the Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure
Code, and other legislation. The second, third, and fourth Law Commissions were constituted
in 1853, 1861, and 1879 respectively. During a span of fifty years, the various commissions
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subsequent enactments" 2 codified the grant of "exclusive privileges" to
patent owners for fourteen years." 3 In 1911, the Indian Patents and
114
Designs Act was enacted effectively, repealing the earlier enactments.
This Act introduced the concept of the Controller of Industrial Patents and
Designs.11 5 However, the patent, legislation lacked a clear policy to pave
the way for industrial development through patents.
When India became independent in 1947, foreign multinationals
controlled 80% of the Indian pharmaceutical industry, 116 and hence
Drugs were
determined the supply and availability of drugs. 1 17
manufactured outside of India and imported at a high cost.11 8 The central
government imported the required drugs under the Drugs Act of 1940.119
This caused the cost of drugs in India to be among the highest in the
world. 2E
Unable to control the expenditure on drugs, in 1948 the Indian
government appointed the first committee, headed by the famous Dr. Tek
Chand, to review the 1911 patent legislation.' 21 The committee noted that
under the 1911 enactment, inventions made by any "manner of
manufacture" were patentable.122 Thereafter, the committee recommended
a clearer definition of a "manner of manufacture."' 3 It concluded that the
recommended legislation on a variety of subjects, mostly on the pattern of the English laws and
adapted them to Indian conditions. The Patents Act was one such legislative act. Id.
112. See generally Ragavan supra note 110. The 1856 patents legislation was amended in
1859 to extend "exclusive privileges" for making, selling, licensing, and using inventions in
India. The Patterns and Designs Protection Act, 1872 protecting industrial designs for the first
time, followed the 1856 enactment. The Protection of Inventions Act was legislated in 1883.
Finally, the 1872 and the 1883 legislations were combined and the Inventions and Designs Act,

1888 was passed. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. D.P. Dubey, Globalisation and itsImpact on the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry,
1999), available at http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.

REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY (April

org/rdv5nl/pharmacy.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
117. Banerji, supra note 102, at 79.
118. Id.
119. See generally Abhijit Dey et al., Pharmaceutical Marketing inIndia: A Macroscopic

View (Nov. 2001), at http://www.sbaer.uca.edu/research/1999/SMA/99smal51.htm (last visited
Jan. 28, 2003).
120. Banerji, supra note 102, at 79. In 1961, a U.S. Senate committee headed by Senator
Estes Kefauver, remarked that India ranked among the highest priced nations in the world for
drugs. Id.
121. Id.at 63-64. Dr. T.B. Chand, a retired judge of the High court, chaired the committee.
This committee's recommendations were incorporated in the amendments to the 1911 act that
were introduced in 1950. Id. at 67.
122. Id. at 63.
123. Id. at 64-65.
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ill-defined patent provisions in India enabled multinational companies to
gain patent rights beyond the scope of their invention. 124 The patent
legislation in India was amended in 1950.125
Although the
recommendations of the committee were incorporated in the amendments to
the patent legislation,
no substantial changes resulted in the functioning of
26
the patent system. 1
a. Limiting Factors of a PatentSolution
The Indian government took two significant steps to ensure accessibility
of medication to the poor. First, the government entered into an agreement
with United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund ("UNICEF")
for the manufacture of penicillin and other antibiotics. 127 This resulted in
the establishment of the Hindustan Antibiotic Limited in 1954 to
manufacture drugs at a cheaper cost for the public.' 28 Next, the government
appointed the Justice Rajagopala-Ayyangar Committee in 1957129 to
recommend revisions to the patent law to suit local industrial needs.' 30 The
object of the committee was to ensure that India developed a locally
sustainable pharmaceutical market.131
The committee's
1959
32
recommendations formed the foundation for patent law in India. 1

124. Id. at 65.
125. Id. at 66.
126. Id. The amendment vested the controller with the power to grant a patent unless there
were "good reasons" to refuse. Id.
127. See HINDUSTAN ANTIBIOTICS LIMITED HEALTH-CARE AND AGROVET PRODUCTS,
PROFILE (1999) at http://www.hindantibiotics.com/htdocs/profile.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2003).
128. Id.
129. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, PATENTS ENQUIRY COMMITTEE, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF
THE PATENTS LAW (Sept. 1959) (by Shri Justice N. Rajagopala-Ayyangar) [hereinafter
RAJAGOPALA-AYYANGAR REPORT].

The report of this committee is considered to be the

backbone of the Indian Patent legislation enacted in 1970. Ragavan, supra note 110, at n.2.
130. Banjeri, supra note 102, at 63.
131. See V.R. Krishna Iyer, Human Health and Patent Law, FRONTLINE, Oct. 14-27, 2000,
at 21, available at http://www.flonnet.com/fl I721/17210790.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
132. VR. Krishna Iyer, GATT, TRIPS and Patent Law, THE HINDU, Sept. 11, 2000, at 5.
The wide admiration for the Rajagopala-Ayyangar report has been recorded in the words of
Justice Krishna lyer, a renowned Supreme Court Justice in India:
A well-debated, development-oriented and patriotically processed statute of
1970, with a progressive perspective and successful sequel, passed after a
thorough study (based on the Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar Commission
report) proved a tremendous national triumph for the consumer and the
manufacturer alike. [It proved to be the] finest and most just parliamentary
achievement ....
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The Rajagopala-Ayyangar Report embraced the patent system by
observing that, "[m]anufacturers would not be prepared to develop and
produce important machinery if others could get the results of their work
with impunity. '" 133 This Report.pointed out several shortcomings in the
functioning of the Indian patent system 134 and indicated that the lack of a
clear directive in the patent legislation enabled multinational companies to
use the legislative loopholes to their benefit. 135 The Report pointed to a
decision136 of the Bombay High Court' 37 where the issue was whether using
a different process of production 138 would amount to an infringement of the
patent for the product. 139 The Report pointed out that the ambiguity in the
legislation provided for overly broad claims. 140 This enabled patentees to
cover several processes of production and thus limit innovation.
In recommending changes, the Ayyangar committee was bound by the
provisions of the Indian Constitution. Article 21 of the Constitution
133. Iyer, supra note 131.
134. There were several instances where licenses to manufacture were denied although the
patentees were not working the patents. Banjeri, supra note 102, at 64.
135. For example, the Rajagopala-Ayyangar Report pointed to the case of Farwerke
Hoechst v. Unichem Labs., 1969 A.I.R. 56 (Bom.) 255 (India).
136. Hoechst, 1969 A.I.R. 56 (Bom.) 255 (India).
137. High Courts in India are courts of appeal established by the Constitution of India.
INDIA CONST. ch. IV, art. 124. Every state within the country has a high court. The high courts
are the highest court of appeal within the state. The Supreme Court of India, the highest court
in the country, is the next level of appeal from the high courts. Indian Courts, Indian Judiciary,
Ministry of Communications and Information, at http://indiancourts.nic.in/Indian jud.htm (last
visited Mar. 17, 2003).
138. Tolbutamide was the end product in both processes. The defendant manufacturer used
the method of desulfurization with hydrogen peroxide.
The plaintiff manufactured
sulphonylureas of the general formula R-S0 2 -NH-CO-NH-RI where the thioureas of the
formula R-SO 2 -NH-CS-NH-R1 were treated with agents eliminating the sulphur to produce
tolbutamide. Hoechst, 1969 A.I.R. 56 (Bom.) 255 at 258, 263 (India).
139. Id. at 258, 259. In this case the Haffkine Institute of India produced tolbutamide from
locally available raw materials and patented the process. Id. at 258. Hoechst filed a suit
claiming that the tolbutamide was mentioned in their 1956 patent application for producing
benzonesuplhonyl urea. Id. The Bombay High Court noted that tolbutamide was only a byproduct in the Hoechst application and that the Haffkine process was not mentioned in the
patent application. Id. at 261. The process of production differed in both cases although the
end product remained the same. Id. at 264.
140. RAJAGOPALA-AYYANGAR REPORT, supra note 129, at 60. The claim language of
Hoechst was wide and covered all processes of production permitted by the ambiguity in the
legislation. Hoechst, 1969 A.I.R. 56 (Bom.) at 260 (India). Claim 22 of the application detailed
that "[t]he compounds of the formula shown in Fig. 6 of the drawings, whenever obtained
according to claims 1-15." Id. at 263. Figure 6 contained the formula of tolbutamide. Id.
However, Claim one "cover[edl compounds obtained by the chemical reaction specified therein,
either directly ... or indirectly ....
IId. at 264. The court found in favor of Hoechst because
the patent legislation was ambiguous enough to accommodate broad claims covering much
beyond the scope of the inventions. Id. at 264-65.
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1 42
guarantees the right to life,14 1 which includes the right to good health.
The Preamble of the Constitution requires policies to balance "social and
economic" rights. 143 Hence, public health concerns need to be weighed
with business interests in amending the patent legislation. The RajagopalaAyyangar Report argued that a patent policy vesting an unrestrained
monopoly would deny vast sections of India's population access to
medicine. 144 Hence, the report concluded that vesting unfettered monopoly
rights violated the right to good health guaranteed under the Indian
Constitution. 14 The report proposed a compulsory licensing system and a
drugs as means to develop a local pharmaceutical
process for patenting
46

industry in India. 1

Based on the Rajagopala-Ayyangar Report, a bill was introduced in
1965.147 Although the Lok Sabha passed this bill, it lapsed in the Upper
House. 14 8 A revised bill 149 was re-introduced in 1967 and passed in 1970
for which the draft rules were passed in 1971. The act and the rules came
into force in 1972.150

b.

Solutions in Price Control

The enactment of the patent legislation paved a path for local
manufacturing of drugs. However, the drug prices had to be affordable to
the poor. Hence, the Drug Price Control Order was passed in 1970"' to

141. INDIA CONST. art. 21.

142.
143.
144.
145.

Iyer, supra note 131, at 21.
INDIA CONST. pmbl.
Banjeri, supra note 102, at 65.
V.R. Krishna Iyer, Patent Law-Patently Unfair?, THE HINDU, Mar. 3, 2002, at

Opinion Section.
146. Banjeri, supra note 102, at 69.
147. See RAJIV JAIN & RAKHEE BISWAS, LAW OF PATENTS: PROCEDURE & PRACTICE § 1.1
(2d ed. 1999).
148. Ragavan, supra note 110. There are two houses of Parliament in India, the lower
house or the Lok Sabha [hereinafter Lower House] and the Rajya Sabha [hereinafter Upper
House]. Indian Parliament, Introduction, at http://alfa.nic.in/intro/introparl.htm (last visited
Mar. 14, 2003). The Lower House is comparable to the House of Commons and the Upper
House to the House of Lords in England.
149. JAIN & BISWAS, supra note 147, § 1.1. A joint committee of Parliament was formed to
study the bill. Id. The suggestions of the Joint Parliamentary CommissioA were incorporated
and the bill was introduced again as the Patents (Amendment) Bill, 1965. Id. In 1966, the
revised bill was tabled again in the Lower House but it lapsed due to the dissolution of the
Lower House. Id.
150. Patents Act of 1970, 27 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 450 (2d ed. 1979).
151. The Drug Policy was established in the year 1978. Banerji, supra note 102, at 84.
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enable the government to control drug
prices and provide maximum
152
accessibility of medication to the poor.
A revision introduced to the Drug Price Control Order in 1984
compartmentalized drugs into three categories and exercised price control
over 347 bulk drugs and 4000 formulations.' 53 The Drug Policy of 1986
established a new price control regime.154 This revised policy reduced the
number of categories for price control to two. 155 The number of drugs
under price control was reduced to 143.156 This policy encouraged
competition for the first time while ensuring "abundant availability of
essential, life-saving, and prophylactic medicines of good quality at
reasonable prices."' 1 7 Additionally, the National Pharmaceutical Pricing
Authority was created to review pharmaceuticals under price control and
monitor the prices of decontrolled pharmaceuticals.'
This authority
revised the Drug Policy Control Order in 1987.'15
A new price control evolved with the Modifications in Drug Policy in
1994. 16 A uniform Maximum Allowable Post-Manufacturing Expense for
price control was established for both categories.' 16 A minimum turnover
162
of $1,300,000 per year was required to enforce price control.
163
Pharmaceuticals
market the
competition
exempt from
price controls. 164having
This sufficient
policy reduced
number ofare
price-controlled

152. Id. After the Drug Price Control Order was passed, the government of India placed
most drugs under price control. Id.
153. The categories were meant to separate drugs most essential for the national health care
programs from the other drugs. Id. The degree of price control exercised varied with the
category of the drug. Id.
154. Suresh Koshy, The Effect of TRIPs on Indian PatentLaw: A PharmaceuticalIndustry
Perspective, 1 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 36, at 4 (1995) (listing 21 category I drugs and 122
category II drugs).
155. Id. 26. Category I consists of drugs for the National Health Program and category II
encompasses drugs for health needs. Id. The "Maximum Allowable Post-Manufacturing
Expense" for price control in category I is 75% and category II is 100%. Id. Thus there was a
separate price-markup ceiling for each category. Id. The post-manufacturing expenses include
advertising and distribution costs. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. 25.
158. Id. 27.
159. Id. 26.
160. Modifications to Drug Policy, Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (April 1996), at
http://indianconsulate-sf.org/iebo/drug.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
161. Koshy, supra note 154 26.
162. Koshy, supra note 154 27.
163. Id. 27. Sufficient market competition is indicated by the presence of at least five
active ingredient producers and ten formulators and no more than forty percent of the market
share. Id.
164. Id.
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pharmaceuticals to a mere seventy-three. 16 5 The policy enhanced incentives
to research and development by exempting active ingredient manufacturers
from price control for ten years, provided
inventive processes were
166
developed through research and development.
The various drug price control orders ensured availability of drugs at
affordable costs. Although pharmaceutical prices were controlled, the
Indian government, to its credit, attempted to phase out these controls with
the growth of the indigenous pharmaceutical industry.' 67 Unfortunately,
because the same realities of poverty that forced India to adopt a process
patent legislation remain unaltered, the drug price control could not be
totally abolished."' In 1993, 37% of the Indian population lived below the
poverty line. 169 The ninth five-year plan estimated that 320 million people
lived below poverty line. 17 As late as 2001, the Indian Prime Minster
detailed elimination of poverty as17 1a primary objective in the opening
address for the tenth five-year plan.
2.

Poverty Issues in Brazil

Like India, Brazil also embraced a weak intellectual property system in
order to provide for the poor. The Brazilian government abolished patent
protection for pharmaceutical products in 1969.172 The government
reasoned that it would "create a stronger domestic pharmaceutical industry
in the face of the dominant foreign multinational competitors."' 173 "[In
1971, Brazil [totally] abrogated patent protection for pharmaceutical
manufacturing processes" to provide medicines for the poor. 174 The state165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. 25, 27.
168. Although the per capita income has increased, poverty continues to be a problem. See
id. 36-37.
169. Reducing Poverty in Indian: Options for More Effective Public Services, World Bank
Group (June 29, 1998), at http://poverty.worldbank.org/library/new/8679 (last visited Mar. 17,
2003) (indicating 37% in rural areas and 31% in urban areas).
170. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, PLANNING COMM'N OFF. Doc., NINTH FIVE YR. PLAN, (19972002) (Vol. I & II) (Jan. 2002), available at http://www.planningcommission.nic.in/fiveyr/
default.html.
171. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, PLANNING COMM'N OFF. DOc., TENTH FIVE YR. PLAN,

(2002-2007) (Vol I & II)

(Jan. 2002),

available at http://www.planningcommission.

nic.in/fiveyr/default.html.

172. See Christopher S. Mayer, The Brazilian PharmaceuticalIndustry Goes Walking from
Ipanema to Prosperity: Will the New Intellectual PropertyLaw Spur Domestic Investment?, 12
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 377, 379 (1998).
173. Id.
174. Id.
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owned Central de Medicamentos was created and a master plan was drafted
for the implementation of the 1971 policy, under the direct supervision of
the President. 175 The plan revived state-owned laboratories and vested
preferential treatment in local companies to promote domestic manufacture
of pharmaceuticals without "threaten[ing] . . . growth of private and
domestic firms."' 176 This enabled the development of a generic drug
industry in Brazil, which accounted for approximately 15% of the Brazilian
market. 177 Not until 1996 did Brazil provide for patent protection under a
new Industrial Property Law.178 The patent term was extended to twenty
origin.
years from the date of patent application in the country of
180
Specialized courts were also established to hear patent disputes.
The 550,000 known HIV cases in Brazil, a country of 170 million
people, threatened its public health safety.18 1 Thus, Brazil had to provide its
low-income population with affordable, generic equivalents to costly HIV
medicine. A local working requirement was also introduced empowering
the Brazilian government to grant a compulsory license for drugs not
produced within Brazil. 182 Local pharmaceutical companies manufactured
generic versions of eight of the twelve drugs in the AIDS "cocktail" at 70%
below market price.
The compulsory license scheme of the government
84
for 100,000 low-income patients each year.'
treatment
free
enabled
Thereafter, Brazil demonstrated a significant improvement in public
health. 185 The government claims to have saved $420 million in AIDS
drugs. 8 6 Because "approximately 540,000 Brazilians [are still] infected
with HIV/AIDS," Brazil continues8 7to aggressively pursue the compulsory
license scheme in its patent policy.1
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 388.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 389.
Jessica Galeria, Patients Ignored: Brazil Puts AIDS Case Before Drug Profits,
AMERICAS.ORG, at http://www.Americas.org/News/Features/200104_BrazilAIDSDrugs/200
1040 1_index.asp (last visited Mar. 14, 2003).
182. See National Production of Antiretroviral Drugs, NATIONAL AIDS DRUGS POLICY,
June 2001, availableat http://www.aids.gov.br/fina/biblioteca/drug/drug5.htm (last visited Jan.

23, 2003).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Galeria, supra note 181; see also Naomi A. Bass, Implications of the TRIPS
Agreement for Developing Countries: PharmaceuticalPatent Laws in Brazil and South Africa
in the 21st Century, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 191, 209 (2002).

186. Bass, supra note 185, at 209.
187. Id.
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Like Brazil and India, most developing countries house high populations
with larger shares of diseases. Low literacy rates and limited education
contribute to poverty and increase the need for low-priced necessities. The
great number of indigent citizens creates an incredible demand on the
governments to provide medical supplies at affordable prices. 188 Thus, the
generic drug industry developed using patent policy as a mandate to provide
affordable medication for the poor communities.
III.

THE STORY OF DEVELOPING NATIONS EMBRACING TRIPS

The developed nations have uniformly encountered problems with
specific features of the patent regimes of developing nations.
The
discussion below specifies the features of the Indian Patent Act of 1970 and
highlights those aspects that directly contravene TRIPS. It traces how
developing countries tackled local issues using patent policies. Thereafter,
the discussion focuses on how the Indian government was pressured into
"voluntarily" amending its patent legislation. Under international pressure,
governments had to totally ignore the effects and the reactions of the people
to the amendment.
A.

Patentingin India

The analysis of the Indian patent legislation vis-A-vis the TRIPS
provisions highlights how developing nations structure patent legislation to
alleviate poverty and health care issues. It shows that developed nations
cannot hope to move developing nations successfully towards a trade
regime unless solutions are devised for problems addressed by the preTRIPS legislations in developed countries.
1.

Patentable Inventions in India

Under the Patents Act of 1970 ("the Act") any "new" and "useful"
invention, 189 qualifies for a patent, provided the claims and the
specifications can be read in that light.'
The terms "new" and "useful"
were not statutorily defined. Hence, the Supreme Court of India enunciated
the test of the inventive step to define "new" and "useful" as the novelty

188. See Koshy, supra note 154, 36.
189. Patents Act of 1970, 27 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 450, § 20) (2d ed. 1979).
190. See Raj Parkash v. Mangat Ram Choudhary, 1978 A.I.R. 65 (Del.) 1, 7 (India).
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and utility requirement. 19 1 The issue of whether an invention is "new" and
"useful" is a mixed question of law and fact.
The Indian patent legislation neither defines non-obviousness, nor makes
non-obviousness a test for patentability. The test of non-obviousness can be
used only for patent opposition. In Press Metal Corporation,Ltd., v. Noshir
Shorabji,192 the Bombay High Court held that to be patentable an invention
has to be non-obvious. 193 Obviousness is judged by the standard of a man
skilled in the specific art.194 Thus the court
intertwined non-obviousness
95
within the novelty and utility requirement.'
196
Section 3 of the Act excludes certain inventions from patentability.
"[I]nvention[s], the primary or intended use of which would be contrary to
law or morality or injurious to public health," 19 7 are excluded from
patentability to facilitate compulsory license. 198 Biotech patents have been
excluded on the premise that the definition of "manufacture" does not
include living organisms and that the definition of "substances" excludes
191. Bishwanath Prasad Radhey Shyam v. Hindustan Metal Industries, A.I.R. 1982 S.C.
1444 (India).
192. 1983 A.I.R. (Bom.) 144 (India).
193. Id. at 144.
194. Id. at 144-45.
195. Id.
196. Section 3 of Patents Act, 1970 states:
The following are not inventions within the meaning of this Act: a) an
invention which is frivolous or which claims anything obvious contrary to
well established natural laws; b) an invention the primary or intended use of
which would be contrary to law or morality or injurious to public health; c)
the mere discovery of a scientific principle or the formulation of an abstract
theory; d) the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known
substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus
unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one
new reactant; e) a substance obtained by a mere admixture resulting only in
the aggregation of the properties of the components thereof or a process for
producing such substance; f) the mere arrangement or re-arrangement or
duplication of known devices each functioning independently of one another
in a known way; g) a method or process of testing applicable during the
process of manufacture for rendering the machine, apparatus or other
equipment more efficient or for the improvement or restoration of the
existing machine, apparatus or other equipment or for the improvement or
control of manufacture; h) a method of agriculture or horticulture; i) any
process for the medicinal, surgical, curative, prophylactic or another
treatment of human beings or any process for a similar treatment of animals
or plants to render them free of disease or to increase their economic value or
that of their products.
Patents Act of 1970, 27 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 450, § 3 (2d ed. 1979).
197. Id. § 3(b).
198. See id. This clause is similar to the exception under article 27 in TRIPS. See TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 8, art. 27(2).
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living organisms. 199 The "law or morality" phrase in section 3 may also
raise issues concerning the patentability of biotech patents. 20 0 Exclusion of
a 'mere discovery of a scientific principle or the formulation of an abstract
theory" denies protection to software-related material. 20 ' Clause (h) of
section 3 excludes "a method of agriculture or horticulture" 20 2 and does not
provide for plant varieties protection.20 3 Notably, protection of plant
varieties by some form of intellectual property is mandatory under
TRIPS .204

2.

Process Patents in India

A patent may be granted for a product or a process. 205 A product patent
protects the end product. Process patents limit protection to the process of
production or the method of making. The Patents Act merely awards
process patent protection for inventions relating to food, drugs, medicine,
and chemical processes. 206 Since the actual product is not protected, the
same product may be manufactured by another process. Therefore, several
processes of producing the same product can be subjects of different
process patents. This provision contravenes articles 27 and 28 of TRIPS.
Article 27 stipulates that "patents shall be available for any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology" in all member

199. Dimminaco A.G. v. Controller of Patents Designs, 2001 A.I.R. 1 (Cal.), 7-8 (India).
200. Patents Act of 1970, 27 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 450, § 3(b) (2d ed. 1979). Although
there are no cases decided so far in India on this point, there are several cases from the
European Patent Convention, which has objectives similar to TRIPS. See, e.g., Howard
Florey/Relaxin, (opposition by Fraktion der Griinen im Europaischen Parlament; Lannoye),
1995 E.P.O.R. 541 (Germany); Plant Genetic Systems/Glutamine Synthetase Inhibitors
(Opposition by Greenpeace), 1995 E.P.O.R. 357 (Germany).
201. Patents Act of 1970, 27 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 450, § 3(c) (2d ed. 1979).
202. Id. § 3(h).
203. New plant variety protection legislation was introduced in 1999 to coincide with
TRIPS. Plant Variety Protection and Farmers Rights Bill (1999) (enacted 2002).
204. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 27(3)(b) ("Members shall provide for the
protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any
combination thereof.").
205. Patents Act of 1970, 27 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 450, § 3(d) (2d ed. 1979).
206. Section 5 of the Patents Act provides that
in the case of inventions a) claiming substances intended for use, or capable
of being used, as food or as medicine or drug, or b) relating to substances
prepared or produced by chemical processes (including alloys, optical glass,
semi conductors and inter metallic compounds), no patent shall be granted in
respect of claims for the substance themselves, but claims for the methods or
processes of manufacture shall be patentable.
Id. § 5.
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states. 207 Article 28 prohibits third parties from using the product where the
subject matter of the patent is the process.208
3.

Compulsory Licenses and Working of Patents in India

The Ayyangar committee's recommendations to balance economic and
social justice resulted in provisions on compulsory licenses and local
manufacturing of patents. Compulsory licenses enable the government to
intervene if the patents are not worked for the benefit of the people. The
local manufacturing requirement of the patented products ensures "that
patented inventions are worked [locally] on a commercial scale ...

to the

fullest extent that is reasonably practicable." 20 9 Any interested third party
210
can seek a compulsory license three years after a patent is granted.
Compulsory licenses are granted under section 84 on the grounds that either
the patent has not been worked to satisfy the reasonable requirement of the
public, or that the patented invention is not reasonably priced. 2 11 The
controller of patents can compulsorily license the patent, taking into account
several factors including the nature of the invention and2 12the applicant's
ability to work the invention to the advantage of the public.
to
Alternatively, under section 86, the central government has the right 213
request that the controller endorse a patent with the "license of right.,
Licenses of right are granted on the same grounds as compulsory
214
If the controller is satisfied with the arguments of the central
licenses.
government, the controller can issue an order endorsing the patent with a
"license of right" under section 86(2). 2151 Section 87 deems that a license of
right is endorsed three years after the date of sealing the patent for
inventions in food, medicine, drug and chemical processes. 16 A patent
subjected to either a compulsory license or a license of right is open under
section 88 for any person interested in working the patent to acquire a
manufacturing license notwithstanding the patentee's approval. 217 The
concept of licenses of right is alien to TRIPS. TRIPS does, however,
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 27(1).
Id. art. 28(1)(b).
Patents Act of 1970, 27 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 450, § 94 (2d ed. 1979).
Id. § 84(1).
Id.
Id. § 85(i)-(ii).
Id. § 86(1).
Id.
Id. § 86(2).
Id. § 87(1). These are inventions entitled to process patents under section 5. Id.
Id.§ 88.

§ 5.
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provide for compulsory licenses under article 31, subject to certain terms
2
and conditions. T
Satisfying the reasonableness requirement of the public is a precondition
to avoiding compulsory licensing of the patent. Section 90(c) of the Patents
Act deems that the reasonableness requirement of the public is not satisfied
unless the invention has worked within India. 2 19
The "reasonable
requirement of the public" condition is also violated under section 90 if any
"establishment or development of commercial activities in India is
prejudiced" because the patentee refuses to license the patent. 22 Article
27(1) of TRIPS stipulates that patent rights shall be enjoyed "without
discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and
whether the products are imported or locally produced.", 22 1 TRIPS does not
distinguish between an importer and a local producer; it vests the same
rights on both.222
4.

Term of Patents in India

Section 53(1) of the Act vests process patents in food, drugs, and
medicines for five years from the date of sealing or seven years from the
date of filing a complete specification, whichever is shorter.223 However, a
license of right is deemed to vest on inventions relating to food, drugs, and
medicines after three years of patent protection. 224 Therefore, exclusive
protection is effectively provided for only three years. 22 5 Patent protection
for other inventions is available for a period of fourteen years, 226 unlike the
twenty-year protection prescribed in TRIPS.227

5.

Burden of Proof (in India)

The Indian Patent Act does not vest the burden of proof of infringement
on either party. However, the Nagpur High court held in the 1953 case
Bombay Agarwal v. Ramchand Diwan Chand228 that the "onus of proving
218. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 31.
219. Patents Act of 1970, 27 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 450,

§ 90(c) (2d ed. 1979).

220. Id. § 90(a)(iv).
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 27(1).
Id.
Patents Act of 1970, 27 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 450,
Id. §§ 86(1), 87(1)(a)(i).
Id.
Id. § 53(1)(b).
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 33.
1953 A.I.R. 40 (Nag.) 154 (India).

§ 53(1)(a) (2d ed. 1979).
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the infringement lies upon the plaintiff, who has not only to prove the patent
in his favour, but also to prove that the patent is being infringed by resorting
to a process patented by the plaintiff., 229 This contravenes article 34 of
TRIPS which vests the burden of proof on the defendant in all civil
proceedings relating to infringement of process patents. 23' Article 34
applies if the patented process is used to obtain a new product or if the
is unable to determine the process used in an identical
patent owner
1
product.

23

B.

India TRIPS at Marrakech

India was amidst political turmoil when it was obtaining WTO
membership. Congress (1)232 was in power from 1986 to 1989, 2f 3 and it
refused to negotiate over patent reform when the Uruguay Round
negotiations were concluded.234 Congress (I) lost its majority in the
parliament in 1989. 2 35 In 1996, Congress (I) became the ruling minority
2 36
government when India became a signatory to the TRIPS agreement.
India had no obligation to comply with TRIPS for one year from the date of
the Agreement (April 1994), except for article 70, sub-clauses (8) and (9)
which mandated the immediate establishment of an interim mechanism to
provide exclusive marketing rights for agricultural, chemical and
pharmaceutical products.237 India could not afford to violate TRIPS and

229. Id. at 157.
230. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 34(1).
231. Id.
232. George K. Foster, Comment, Opposing Forces in a Revolution in InternationalPatent
Protection: The U.S. and India in the Uruguay Round and its Aftermath, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. &

FOREIGN AFF. 283, 319 (1998). Congress (I) is one of the major political parties in India that
was in power before the current Bharatiya Janata Party ("BJP"). The original Congress party
was split into Congress (I) and Congress (J). Congress (I) signified that part of the party that
was led by Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India. Congress (J) stands for the
Janata Congress-another faction of the original Congress party. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 320.
235. Id. at 319.
236. Id. In the elections of May 1996, the BJP won 162 seats while the Congress (I) won
140 seats. Id. That left India with a coalition government consisting of the United Front a
coalition of regional parties, and Congress (I). Id. at 319-20.
237. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 70(8)-(9). This interim mechanism, also known
as the "mail box provision," was meant to facilitate filing patent applications in chemicals, food,
and drugs until the product patent regime was established. Shishir Mehta & Rajesh Chavda,
The Mailbox Dispute and Implications on Indian Patent Regime, THE STUDENT ADVOCATE T 5,

at 40 (1998).
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face trade sanctions impacting Indian exports. 238 However, Congress (I)
sensed that local economic conditions would impede amendments to the
Patents Act of 1970. 239
Congress (I) also understood that patent
amendments would directly affect the party's popularity among the
people. 240 Hence, Congress (I) was forced to take an ambiguous position in
fear of Special 301 on one side and local politics on the other. a41
At the end of the parliamentary session on December 31, 1994, the
President of India promulgated the Patents (Amendment) Ordinance 242 and
amended the Patents Act, 1970. 243 The ordinance became effective January
1, 1995, and India notified the council for TRIPS under article 63(2).244 A
press note was issued stating that the Indian government had appointed an
expert committee to examine issues arising from the grant of exclusive
marketing rights.245 However, the ordinance was not approved in both
houses within six weeks of the re-assembly of the Parliament and, as a
result, it lapsed on March 26, 1995.246
By this time, the Bharatiya Janata Party ("BJP") was in power.247 Like
Congress, the BJP also sensed that amending the patent legislation would
negatively impact its new-found popularity. 24 8 Influenced by international
pressure, the BJP government passed the Patents (Amendment) Bill 1995.249
250
This bill intended to give permanent legislative effect to the ordinance.
The Lok Sabha passed the bill in March 1995.251 Unfortunately, the bill
failed in the Rajya Sabha and was referred to the select parliamentary
committee 252 for examination. The report of the select committee was not
238. Foster, supra note 232, at 317 (noting that the United States was "extending
preferential tariff treatment under the GATT Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) ... [t]he
U.S. revoked duty-free treatment under the GSP for India's exports of pharmaceuticals, citing
India's poor protection of U.S. patented drugs . . . result[ing] in a levy of $60 million[,]" thus
reducing Indian exports) (internal citation omitted).
239. Id. at 321.
240. See id.
241. Id. at 317, 321.
242. Mehta & Chavda, supra note 237, 7. In India, ordinances have the force of law
provided both houses approve the ordinance within six weeks of the beginning of a new session
of the parliament. Id.
243. Banerji, supra note 102, at 61.
244. Mehta & Chavda, supra note 237,
7-8.
245. Id.
246. Id. 7.
247. Foster, supra note 232, at 319-20.
248. Id. at 321.
249. Mehta & Chavda, supra note 237, 9.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. In India, a bill has to be approved by a simple majority in both Houses of the
Parliament before it is passed. The bill is then assented to by the President to become an act.
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tabled before the dissolution of the Lok Sabha on May 10, 1996; hence the
Patents (Amendment) Bill lapsed with the dissolution of the tenth Lok
an administrative order to
Sabha.253 The Indian government instituted
254
interim.
the
in
accept patent applications
Meanwhile, the United States, tired of waiting for India to comply with
TRIPS, sought consultation through the WTO. 255 The United States
requested that the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO examine whether
India defaulted on its TRIPS obligation. 256 India argued that since the
applications for chemical and biological patents were being filed, "effective
means," as required by TRIPS, had been effectuated.257 Furthermore, India
argued that developing countries were entitled to delay the process under
article 65(2) for four years. 8 The United States countered that the mere
fact that India issued an ordinance indicates the need for a formal
legislation.2 5 9 The panel ruled that India was in default of its obligations
and refused to consider the administrative notifications as a mechanism in
compliance with the requirements under TRIPS. 260 The panel's ruling
mandated that India immediately implement a transitional system as
required under 70(9).261 The appellate body upheld the panel decision.262
The bill lapses if the Lok Sabha does not approve it. If a bill is approved by the Lok Sabha, but
not by the Rajya Sabha, a parliamentary committee is appointed to deliberate over it. The
committee consults experts, academics, and other people concerned in that particular area of

law. The committee's report is passed to the Parliament and to the concerned department. The
government has the option of agreeing or disagreeing with the changes suggested. It is then sent
to the Cabinet for approval, at which stage the bill is again placed before the Lok Sabha, and
after approval, to the Rajya Sabha. Indian Parliament, Committees, at http://alfa.nic.in/rs/
book2/general.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2003).
253. Mehta & Chavda, supra note 237, 9.
254. Id. 14. Later, the Indian government would quote that this order was an "effective
legal mechanism" fulfilling the requirements of TRIPS. Id.
255. The U.S. asked for a consultation on July 2, 1996, under article 4 of The
Understanding read with Article 64 of TRIPS. The consultation failed on July 27, 1996. Id.
5, 10.
256. Id. 11. The U.S. requested a panel to take up the dispute on November 7, 1996. Id.
A panel was constituted under the procedures of the WTO on November 20, 1996. Id.
257. Id. 14.
258. Id. 31.
259. Id. 34.
260. WTO Dispute Panel, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticaland Agricultural

Chemical Products, WT/DS50/R at 81 (Sept. 5, 1997) [hereinafter Panel Report], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu_e/distabasewtomembers 1_e.htm.
261. Id.
262. WTO Appellate Body Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and

Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/AB/R at 97 (Dec. 19, 1997) [hereinafter Appellate
Report],
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/distabase-wtomembersle.htm. On appeal, India raised the issue of clarification of the interpretation of the
term "means" in article 70(8) of TRIPS. Mehta & Chavda, supra note 237, IM 60, 64. India

35:0117]

CAN'T WE ALL GETALONG?

The Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO formally adopted the findings in
January 1998. 263 This decision forced India to amend the patent legislation
to avoid trade sanctions. 264 The BJP and Congress (I) (the ruling and the
opposition parties, respectively) worked together to put the delayed
legislation in place. 265 The Patents Amendment Act was thus passed in
December 1999.266
This first patent amendment introduced Chapter IV-A, which established
the interim mechanism for granting exclusive marketing rights as required
by the WTO. 267 A provision was introduced that would allow for the grant
of exclusive marketing rights, provided the controller is satisfied that the
claimed substance is patentable. 26 The exclusive marketing right vests five
years after the date of approval by the controller, or the determination of
patentability, whichever is earlier.269 Prior publication or use of the claimed
invention by a third party will not constitute infringement 270 before the
application is filed either in India or in a signatory country of the Patent
Cooperation Treaty. 271 The provisions relating to compulsory licensing
apply in relation to the exclusive marketing right. 272
The central
government also retains the right under section 24D to revoke the exclusive

also questioned whether article 70(8) mandated providing exclusive marketing rights from the
date of entry into force of TRIPS. Id. T 64. The appellate body held that India was obliged to
provide a legal mechanism for an interim mailbox arrangement. Id. 65. This mechanism
needs to be couched on a sound legal basis to preserve the novelty of inventions and priority of
applications as of the relevant filing dates. Id. "Administrative instructions" cannot constitute a
sound legal basis. Id. The appellate body added that Article 70(9) mandates that upon
becoming a member, India should have an effective legal mechanism, "to provide for the grant
of exclusive marketing rights." Id. 66.
263. WTO Appellate Body Report Action by the Dispute Settlement Body, India-Patent
Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT/DS50/9 (Jan. 27,
1998)
[hereinafter DSB Action] available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
dispu e/distabase wto membersl _e.htm.
264. Mehta & Chavda, supra note 237, IT 73-74.
265. See id.
266. Patents Amendment Act (1999) (India).
267. Id. Section 24A(l) was introduced in the Patent legislation mandating the controller to
refer applications seeking an exclusive marketing right to an examiner and then determine
patentability of the invention. Chapter VI-A, Patents Amendment Act 1999. Id. § 24A(1).
268. Id. § 24A(2).
269. Id. § 24B(1)(b). A report on the determination of patentability has to be submitted
within ninety days under rules 33(C) and 33(D) of the draft rules. Ministry of Industry, Patent
(Amendment) Rules § 33 (C)-(D) (India 1999).
270. Patents Amendment Act § 24B(2).
271. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645.
272. Patents Amendment Act § 24(C).
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marketing right in public interest.273 This mechanism is effective in India
until the product patent regime is established in December 2004.274
Under article 70(9) of TRIPS, India was required to fulfill the other
obligations under article 65(2) by January 1, 2000.275 Therefore, the Patents
Amendment Bill 1999 was introduced in the Upper House on December 20,
1999. 276 The object of the bill was to make patent law in India TRIPScompliant. 277 This bill amended the patent term to twenty years 278 and
amended the definition of "invention" in section 20).279 The new definition

required inventions "capable of industrial application" to have an "inventive
step.,

280

The test for "inventive step" was novelty.2 81

Section 3 of the

Patent Act of 1970282 was amended, but reiterated that biological processes
and computer programs are not patentable. 283 Plants and animals other than
microorganisms, a novel business method or mathematical algorithm,
among other things, also did not qualify as "inventions" under section
32-although this could be justified under Article 27 of TRIPS.
The second bill placed the burden of proof on the defendant in a patent
infringement case. 2 86 The bill deleted the local manufacturing requirement,
but retained "non-working the patented article in India" as a ground for
compulsory licensing from the previous section 84. 287 Section 90(c),
detailing inadequate working of the patent on a commercial scale as a
ground for compulsory licensing, was not deleted. This implies that
manufacturing abroad would continue as a ground for compulsory
licensing.

273. Id. § 24(D).
274. Mehta & Chavda, supra note 237, 75.
275. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 70(9).
276. Patents (Second) Amendment Bill (1999) (India).
277. Statement of Objects and Reasons, Patents (Second) Amendment Bill (1999) (India)
(introduced in the Rajya Sabha on Dec. 20, 1999) (Document No. XLIX 1999).
278. Id. cls. 21, 24 (codified as amended at Patents Act 1970 § 53(1)(b)).
279. Patents (Second) Amendment Bill § 3(f).
280. Id. § 3(j). "'Invention' means a new product or process involving an inventive step
and capable of industrial application; 'inventive step' means a feature that makes the invention
not obvious to a person skilled in the art." Id. § 30a).
281. See id.
282. Patents Act of 1970, 27 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 450, § 3 (2d. ed. 1979) (listing items
excluded from patentability).
283. Patents Amendment Bill § 4(e).
284. Id.
285. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 27.
286. Patents Amendment Bill § 50. This provision refers to process patents because India
had five more years at the time of the bill to fall within the product patent regime. Id.
287. Id. § 39(b).
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As a balancing mechanism, the Department of Health 288 issued a
notification recognizing foreign manufacturers of drugs.289
This
notification required foreign manufacturers to obtain a Certificate of
Registration for each of the premises where drugs were manufactured for
import into India.2 90 The applicant is liable under the notification for the
payment of fees, charges, and prescribed expenditure. 291 The concerned
2 92
authority, or a person duly authorized, can inspect the premises.
Although meant as a balancing mechanism, these provisions also arguably
violate the right to import under articles 27 and 28 of TRIPS.
The amendment also incorporated changes in the compulsory licensing
provisions. Although TRIPS allows for limited compulsory licensing under
article 32, the United States objected to specific instances leading to
compulsory licensing. 293 Hence the second amendment introduced section
95A in the Indian patent legislation. 294 This section provided for the
termination of compulsory license provided the controller is satisfied that
295
circumstances enabling the license cease to exist and will not recur.
Unlike in the Patent Act of 1970, refusals by a patentee to grant a license
ceased to be deemed unreasonable. 29 6 An applicant for compulsory license
should prove that the patentee was approached with reasonable terms for a
license.
Section 107A(b) dealt with parallel imports.298 Importation of a patented
product from a "person . . . duly authorized by the patent" is not
infringement. 299 A framework of appeals has been introduced 300 as required
under the Patent Cooperation Treaty of 1970, which India signed in 1998.301
Therefore, the controller's decisions can be appealed before an appellate
288. The Department of Health is a department of the Ministry of Health and Family
Welfare.
289. Notification G.S.R. 834(E), GAZETTE OF INDIA, Oct. 24, 2000, at 35 ("The following
draft of certain rules further to amend the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, which the Central
Government propose to make, after consultation with the Drugs Technical Advisory Board, in
exercise of the powers conferred by sections 12 and 33 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act,
1940...").
290. Id. at 36-39.
291. Id. at 40.
292. Id. at 46.
293. Mehta & Chavda, supra note 237, 91.
294. Patents (Second) Amendment Bill § 44.
295. Id.
296. Id. § 39(b).
297. Id. § 36.
298. Patents (Second) Amendment Bill § 51.
299. Id.
300. Id. § 54.
301. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645.
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board before reaching the courts. 302 This laudatory move will restrict
parallel imports in tune with article 28(1) of TRIPS.
This second bill was not passed by the Rajia Sabha and was therefore
referred to the select parliamentary committee. 3° The committee examined
the bill and sought further understanding of the issues. 304 The committee
30 5
scheduled a tour to various countries, including Brazil, Argentina,
36
307
9 to discern the best practices.
China,3 6 Japan,
Korea 308 and Canada,3039i310
In the meantime, the WTO met in Doha, where developing countries gained
more concessions. 311 After the Doha Declaration, the Joint Parliamentary
Committee rewrote the bill incorporating the Doha safeguards. 3 12 The
revised bill did not incorporate the product patent regime. The Rajya Sabha
passed the bill on May 9, 2002, and the Lok Sabha on May 15, 2002. 313
India hopes to incorporate the product patent regime through a third
amendment before January 1, 2005.314

302. Patents (Second) Amendment Bill, § 54.
303. Press Release, National Working Group on Patent Laws and Public Interest Legal
Support
and
Research
Centre,
Publications
2002-Publication
16 (2002),
at
http://www.patentmatics.com/pub2002/publ6.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). This is the
general procedure followed for bills rejected by the upper house. See supra note 252.
304. See supra note 252.
305. Brazil and Argentina are also developing countries and have problems similar to
India's. Mario Osava, Health-Latam: AIDS Threatens IndustrialProperty in Form of Patents,
INTER PRESS SERVICE (Nov. 10, 2000) at http://www.aegis.com/news/ips/2000/IPOOI106.html
(last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
306. The committee wanted to understand the reason for increased foreign investments in
China, although China has the same disadvantages as India. Ragavan, supra note 110.
307. The committee wanted to understand Japan's success in enabling transfer of
technology before amending the laws. Id.
308. In 1982 Korea entered into an Agreement with the U.S. to provide patent protection
for pharmaceuticals and defaulted on that Agreement. See Theresa Beeby Lewis, Patent
Protectionfor the PharmaceuticalIndustry, 30 INT'L LAW. 835, 863 (1996).
309. The committee sought to understand how the Canadian government caters to its
generic drug industry. Ragavan, supra note 110.
310. Id. The tour of the parliamentary committee delayed the submission of the report. Id.
311. Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public Health at Qatar, 2001, WTO Fourth
Ministerial Conference, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (01-5859), (Nov. 9-14, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min0 le/mindecl-trips-e.htm.
312. Id. The safeguards in this Declaration allowed members to initiate compulsory
licensing of patented drugs in national emergency. Id. 5(b). A public health crisis was
deemed as a national emergency warranting the use of compulsory licensing provisions. Id.

5(c).
313. Patent Bill Passed, THE HINDU, May 15, 2002, at National, available at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2002/05/15/stories/2002051501381300.htm
(last visited
Mar. 17, 2003).
314. Id. This is the maximum time allowed under article 70 clauses (8) and (9) of TRIPS
for India to embrace a product patent regime. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 70(8)-(9).

CAN'T WE ALL GETALONG?

35:0117]
IV.

HINDRANCES AFFECTING DEVELOPING NATIONS FROM

EMBRACING TRIPS
The development of patent policies discussed in earlier sections of this
article depicts a huge gap in patent familiarity between developed and
developing nations. Additionally, the economic and epidemic conditions of
developing nations warrant a certain focus in patent policy. Under
comparable circumstances, developed nations have preferred similar policy
options. The following discussion identifies hindrances affecting the ability
of developing nations to introduce a sophisticated patent policy as required
under TRIPS.

A.

Missing Basic Requirements to Enforce TRIPS

1. Time Frame
Historically, developed nations needed approximately 150 years to
establish a patent regime as detailed in Part III. Europe and the United
States have benefited from their patent friendliness since the 1700s.
However, a century of experimenting with patent policies was required
before the current patent regime evolved. In contrast, most developing
countries, including India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt, and several African
countries, became independent only as late as the mid-1900s.3"5 Patent
policies were introduced in these countries during the 1900s 31 6 _a century

315. The First Declaration of Independence of Bangladesh was made on March 25, 1971.
Virtual Bangladesh, History, Declaration of Independence, at http://www.virtualbangladesh.
coim/history/declaration.html (last modified Jan. 22, 2003). Pakistan obtained its independence
in August 1947. 123IndependenceDay.com, Pakistan Independence Day Celebrations, at
http://www.123independenceday.com/pakistan/independence/day (last visited Mar. 8, 2002).
Egypt was occupied by the British in 1882 and was given independence in 1922. Egypt,
History of Egypt, at http://www.touregypt.net/hfrench.htm
and http://www.touregypt.
net/hbritish.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2003). Later it was occupied by the Italians and Germans
during World War II, and re-conquered by the British. It was made a republic in the year 1953.
See also Ruth L. Gana, Prospects For Developing Countries Under The TRIPs Agreement, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735, 737 (1996) (discussing the history of multilateral trading system
and that "developing countries clearly remained on the periphery, their relationship to
developed countries tainted deeply with mistrust stemming from the colonial experience").
3 16. Historically, remnants of trademarks and other intellectual property systems have been
identified in developing countries like India and China. Several other developing nations have
had various forms of intellectual property systems either directly or reminiscent of colonial past.
See Ruth Gana Okediji, Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL
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after developed nations established patent policies.3 1 7 Yet, the TRIPS
agreement forces developing countries to catch up and plunge
into the
3 18
current intellectual property system in a matter of only ten years.

2.

Local Manufacturing vs. Trade

Developed nations carved patent policies to improve indigenous
industries and not to facilitate trade as highlighted in Part II.319 The
Industrial Revolution and subsequent events resulted in the development of
manufacturing and industrial capabilities in the developed nations. Patent
320
policy was used to sustain and encourage industrial potential locally.
Strengthening the indigenous industries automatically increased trade. This
paved the way for the development of a patent policy commensurate with
trade.
However, developing countries lack local manufacturing capabilities.
Without aiding the development of indigenous industries, the WTO policy
merely facilitates trade. Devoid of local manufacturing potential, mere
trade will result in the loss of indigenous industries and increased
dependence on foreign companies. 321 This will stunt the economies of
developing countries.
Developing nations are currently not at the
crossroads of industrialization, where it makes sense to promote patent
policies. Since developing countries have nothing to trade and cannot
afford to trade with developed nations, there is a lack of logic in thrusting
the TRIPS patent policy onto these nations.
3.

Economic Gains

Developed nations would not have promoted patent policies had they not
borne economic promise. Studies on TRIPS, on the other hand, project a
definite economic loss resulting from an immediate welfare loss in
developing countries. 3 22 Yet, developing countries are encouraged to
embrace TRIPS. Leading scholars like Robert Sherwood have concluded
LEGAL STUD. 117, 147-48 (1999) (discussing the various forms of intellectual property systems
as "European expansionism").
317. See discussion supra Part II.A.
318. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
319. See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
320. See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
321. See generally Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing
Countries:An Economic Perspective, U. ILL. L. REV. 457 (2001).
322. See Robert M. Sherwood, The TRIPS Agreement: Implications for Developing

Countries, 37 IDEA 491, 493-95 (1997).
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that developing countries may not benefit in the short-run though there will
be long-term returns. 323 Edwin Mansfield concludes that developing
324
countries will only benefit from foreign direct investment in the long-run.
Professor Carlos Correa reiterates that even assuming an increase in
exports, welfare losses will be considerable. 325 Based on an empirical study
in developing nations, Professor Maskus argues that as poor nations "adopt
stronger patents their economies could be exposed to monopoly impacts
with detrimental effects on their [] trade. ,,326 Professor Maskus concludes
that "the short-run impacts of TRIPS will be to redistribute income between
countries, with most gains accruing to the United States and other
technology developers. ' '0 2 7 He adds that "intellectual property protection
will generate additional market power that could [actually] harm
information users. ' 328 Only "[o]ver the longer term . . . technical change
and growth in the technology importing countries could be improved"
provided the stronger intellectual property regimes
are "complemented with
329
appropriate collateral policies and institutions.9
Policies without immediate economic gain will upset the fragile
economic and social balance in developing countries. Social and economic
issues in developing countries are intertwined with trade issues.3 3 °
Developed nations need to address these realities in their entirety before
expecting the already impoverished economies of developing nations to
sustain a policy resulting in further loss.
Importantly, government
motivation is a key factor to introduce and implement policies successfully.
Governments simply lack the incentive to canvass policies with the
knowledge that the resulting welfare loss will deprive them of another
chance to govern.
323. Id. "[T]he impact of the TRIPS Agreement on most developing countries is likely to
be slightly negative in the short run (one to two years) and increasingly favorable as local firms
and individuals begin to realize the potential benefits for their activities." Id. Sherwood,
however, notes that TRIPS may be able to promote foreign investment, but will not be an aide
in encouraging domestic research and development. Id. at 495, 508.
324. Id. at 502 n.33 and accompanying test; see also Evelyn Su, The Winners and the
Losers: The Agreement on Trade-RelatedAspects ofIntellectual PropertyRights and Its Effects
on Developing Countries, 23 Hous. J. INT'L L. 169 n.226 (2000).

325.

CARLOS CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 23 (2000) (emphasizing that losses
have already begun to appear in developing nations).
326. Maskus, supra note 321, at 464.
327. Id. at 472.
328. Id.
329. Id. See generally KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY (2000) (providing a detailed discussion and empirical evaluation of the subject).
330. See Okediji, supra note 316, at 117, 125-44 (discussing the complexity of the issues
relating to trade and welfare, particularly in the context of developing nations).
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Internalization

In general, developed nations provide distinguished infrastructure and
amenities to people resulting in a good lifestyle. Patent policies of the
developed nations furthered economic gains resulting in a better lifestyle
and thus caused people to accept such policies. "The core issue in
developing countries is ... the need for infrastructure, the provision of basic
human needs, the guarantee of basic human rights, and the upward mobility
[of people].,

33 1

The economies of developing countries face crises similar

to what developed nations faced during the depression, including diseases,
overpopulation, lack of infrastructure, and inadequate industrialization. "In
light of such priorities, intellectual property rights, divorced from [the]
immediate needs of a country" are a mere luxury. 332 Developing nations
need to reconcile fundamental infrastructures before furthering trade
policies like the TRIPS patent policy. 333 People in developed nations have

steadily internalized patent policies over time. Patent friendly nations also
experienced periods of patent mistrust during bad economies. The Supreme
Court of the United States, as discussed in Part II, mistrusted patents during
the Depression Era. 334 Even after decades of enjoying the benefits of
patents, the first reaction of the American state
governments in bad
335
economic conditions was to restrict patent rights.
Experts in the area, like Professor Ruth Gana, argue that intellectual
property rights are "a sub-set of a larger body of rights prescribed by public
law. ' ' 336 Professor Correa states that in the absence of other factors,
intellectual property rights will not automatically be influenced
positively. 337 Therefore, if economic conditions deteriorate, the already
poor lifestyle of the people will worsen. Food and drugs will become
unaffordable. Internalization of patent policies by people will be difficult.

331. Gana, supra note 315, at 771.
332. Id.
To be taken seriously in developing countries, intellectual property rights
must interact with existing social structures to promote indigenous
technological innovation and capital development. Without the specific
conditions of strong property systems, stable government, free market
capitalism, and zealous protection of corporate interests, it is unlikely thatmodem intellectual property in and of itself has the potential to transform
developing countries into the technology producers they aspire to become.
Id. at 738.
333. Okediji, supra note 316, at 188.
334. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
335. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 and infra Part IV.E.
336. Gana, supra note 315, at 771.
337. CORREA, supra note 325, at 44-45.
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Hence, developing nations also rightfully require the time for people to
internalize and ease into new policies.
B.

ProperPolicies with InadequateProcedures

Unless proper procedures are established, mere policies will not bring
about a change in the functioning of the patent system. Developing
countries lack the knowledge of procedural rules and mechanisms required
to implement sophisticated policies. Developed nations have to aid the
developing nations in establishing supplementing procedures. The Indian
and American claiming procedures are compared to chart how research and
development are likely to be affected in developing nations.
1.

Claiming Requirements in India

The Indian patent legislation provides that every patent application
should have either a provisional 338 or a complete specification. M The
applicant submits a complete specification within twelve months of filing
the provisional specification. 340 Every specification shall: 1) "describe the
invention," and 2) "begin with a title [] indicating the subject-matter" of the
invention. 34 1 Every complete specification shall: 1) "fully and particularly
describe the invention, [] its operation or use and the method" of
performance of the invention; 2) "disclose the best method of performing
the invention" known to the applicant;
and 3) "end with a claim or claims
342
defining the scope of the invention."
The terms "description of the invention" and "best method" are not
statutorily defined. The only guideline to claim construction is in section
10(5) of the Patent Act of 1970. This section details that claims should be
"clear" and "succinct" and be "fairly based on the matter disclosed in the
' 343
specification."

338. Patents Act of 1970, 25 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 450, § 7(4) (2d ed. 1979). A
provisional specification is a mere description of the nature of the invention and its intended
manner of working. This can be submitted after the inventor is ready with a prototype. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. § 9(1). If it is not so submitted, the application will be deemed abandoned. Id.
341. Id. § 10(l).

342. Id. § 10(4). Rules 14 to 20 of the Patent Rules of 1972 elaborate the requirements for
drawings and models included within the specifications. Patent Rules, 1972 (India) (1972).
343. Patents Act of 1970, 25 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 450, § 10(5) (2d ed. 1979).
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Lack of adequate statutory definition leaves construction of specification
and claims within the courts' domain. 344 The Delhi High Court has held
that claims should specify the nature of the invention as well as the
particular and distinguishing feature of the invention.345 The title of the
346
invention claimed has little consequence in controlling the claim.
Additionally, the Bombay High Court held that the patentee should describe
the nature and the limits of the claim with clarity. 347 No additional
guidelines supplement these broad rules of interpretation, which leaves
unfettered discretion with the judiciary to construe specification and claims.
Thus, claim construction is very subjective and unlimited in India.
2.

American Claims

Claim construction is the heart and soul of the American patent system.
35 U.S.C. § 112 provides the relevant statutory guidance. 34' The United
States Patent and Trademarks Office 349
("USPTO") supplements § 112 with
guidelines to govern claim drafting.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit
supplements claim interpretation techniques through its decisions. The
American courts measure the scope of patent protection from the various
claims.
For example, product-by-process claims describe the product by the
process of production. 350 The patent will be awarded for the product
produced by the patented process. Jepson claims define the invention by
reciting the admitted prior art in the preamble and by adding an
"improvement" clause reciting the ambit of the invention. 351 Functional or
structural limitations are then incorporated to define the patent with
precision. Functional claims describe the product by its function.352 The
344. Lallubhai Chakubhai Jariwala v. Chimanlal Chunilal and Co., 1936 A.I.R. 23 (Born.)
99, 99.
345. Ram Narain Kher v. Ambassador Indus. New Delhi, 1976 A.I.R. 63 (Del.) 87, 88.
346. Raj Parkash v. Mangat Ram Choudhary, 1978 A.I.R. 65 (Del.) 1, 1.
347. Press Metal Corp. v. Noshir Shorabji, 1983 A.I.R. (Born.) 144; see also Parkash, 1978
A.I.R 65 (Del.) 1, 1.
348. 35 U.S.C § 112 (2000).
349. See, e.g., Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,263 (July 14, 1995); see
also Lisa A. Karczewski, Biotechnological Gene Patent Applications: The Implications of the
USPTO Written Description Requirement Guidelines on the Biotechnology Industry, 31
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1043, 1064-66 (2000) (detailing the importance of these guidelines).
350. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, § 11.2(b), at 647; see also Atlantic Thermoplastics
Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 845-47 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
351. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, § 11.2(d), at 677.
352. 35 U.S.C § 112 (2000) (discussing the means plus function approach which is unique
to the American system); see In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1193-96 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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patent will vest on the product performing a specified function. Structural
claim limitations, typically used for biotech inventions, describe the product
structure. 353 The means plus function claim limitations define the function
and the means or mechanism enabling the product to perform the
function.354 The patent vests on the product provided it performs the
function using the means specified in the claim. 355 Therefore, a product
performing the same function with different means is eligible for another
patent.
3.

Effect on Research and Development

The ability of the enactment to cater to a wider range of inventions
within the same product classification through claiming provisions is a
mark of sophistication of the patent system. Such sophistication is acquired
by a thorough understanding of the functioning of the patent system.
TRIPS harmonizes patent systems, but without the supporting procedural
backup, this harmonization will be pointless. Developing nations will lack
the procedural and structural pillars of patent policies. Consequently,
inventions distinguished through functional or structural additions will be
denied patents in developing nations.
On the other hand, developed nations encourage inventions distinguished
through functional or structural additions by using claim sophistication or
patent doctrines. 3 56 For example, in Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo
Cos.,3 57 the patented device related to a portable, adjustable, child's play

chair with a stable rigid frame with a seat and back panel.358 The claimed
invention related to a portable, adjustable, child's play chair but did not
have a stable, rigid frame. 359 Instead, the seat and back panel of the device
fit together to form a rigid frame. 36 The court used the doctrine of
equivalents and held that "a stable rigid frame assembled from the seat and
back panels is not the
equivalent of a separate stable rigid frame" set out in
36 1
the claim language.

353. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, § 11.2(c), at 670-71.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-09 (1950);
Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 17 (1997) (discussing the
doctrine of equivalents).
357. 16 F.3d 394 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
358. Id. at 396.
359. Id. at 397.
360. Id. at 400.
361. Id.
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In the case of In re Donaldson Co.,36 2 the patent related to industrial airfiltering devices often referred to as "dust collectors." 363 Claim one was an
apparatus claim reciting an "air filter assembly for filtering air laden with
364
.,
particulate matter, said assembly comprising: [a plurality of elements] 365
On appeal, the patentee conceded that a single prior art reference (Swift)
met every limitation in claim one except for the limitation of a "means,
responsive to pressure increases in said chamber caused by said cleaning
means, for moving particulate matter in a downward direction." 366 The
Board held that the last limitation was also met by the prior art because
Swift disclosed the recited function. 367 On appeal, the Federal Circuit
considered the issue en banc and unanimously reversed the Board's
decision. 368 The Federal Circuit reasoned that if the prior art does not
disclose the same structure, or an equivalent structure, the claim element is
not literally met and the claim is not anticipated under section 102.369 If the
prior art does not provide a teaching, which renders the claimed structure or
its equivalent obvious, the claim is not obvious under section 103.370 In
essence, two dust collectors differentiated only by a single element have
each been patented. Thus, similar products performing the same functions
and manufactured by the same or similar processes are patentable in the
United States by the use of appropriate claims. The law is dynamic enough
to accommodate different patents for the same range of products with minor
differences. This has provided the incentive for industries working in the
same field to evolve and capitalize on the benefits.
A system that merely has a product patent regime (like the one
contemplated for the developing countries under the WTO) without its
complimentary procedural foundations will effectively block the patenting
of products within the same range. In the above examples, patenting of one
air-filtering device will effectively stop any other air filters from being
patented; thus, it can stunt research and development. Therefore, a product
362. 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
363. Id. at 1190.
364. Id. at 1191 (internal references omitted).
365. Id. at 1191-92. The Board relied solely upon the dust collector disclosed in United
States Patent No. 3,421,295 and titled the Swift patent to affirm the Examiner's rejection of
claim one. Id. The Swift dust collector embodied every element of the subject matter sought to
be patented except for the "'means, responsive to pressure increases in said chamber caused by

said cleaning means, for moving particulate matter in a downward direction'
(quoting claim one of the complaint).
366. Id. at 1191.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 1197.
369. Id.
370. Id.at 1189.

Id. at 1192
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patent regime cannot be blindly introduced unless there is an adequate
understanding of the nuances.
C.

Denialof Genuine Patents

Introduction of the TRIPS regime in developing countries has the danger
of excluding protection for new processes of making known products until
supporting claiming techniques are introduced. Consequently, inventions
patentable in developed nations by use of product-by-process claims may be
unprotected in developing nations. This section examines how patenting of
inventive processes is likely to operate in developing countries if TRIPS is
established.
The use of product-by-process claims facilitates patenting of novel and
non-obvious processes of making known products in developed nations
particularly in the United States and Europe. In Atlantic Thermoplastics
Co. v. Faytex Corp.,3 7 1 the plaintiff owned patent containing process and
product-by-process claims for a shock absorbing shoe innersole made from
an elastomeric material and polyurethane foam. 372 The issue related to
innersoles with elastomeric heel inserts distributed by the defendant. 373 The
defendant bought the product from two separate manufacturers using
separate manufacturing processes. 374 The plaintiffs suit was against the
defendant for infringing the patented process and, therefore, related to both
the manufacturing processes.
The Federal Circuit held that the process of
the first manufacturer infringed the patent, as it contained all the claim
limitations listed in Atlantic Thermoplastics' patent.
The second
manufacturer used a different process to achieve an indistinguishable
376
product; thus, there was no infringement of product-by-process claim.
The Federal Circuit overruled Scripps Clinic by holding that a product
claimed by a product-by-process description is only infringed when the
allegedly infringing product is produced via the same process described in
the claim. 378 The court did not consider the issue relating to the doctrine of
equivalence. In effect, this judgment allows the patenting of different
processes of producing a known product by using the product-by-process
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Id. at 834.
Id. at 835.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

378. Atlantic Thermoplastics,970 F.2d at 838-39.
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claim. A careful study of Judge Rich's harsh dissent criticizing the Federal
Circuit for refusinto rehear Atlantic Thermoplastics379 en banc reflects
this understanding.
The patent protection regimes of developing nations protect novel
processes of producing known products although the product is not patent
protected.381 Both systems facilitate protection of innovative processes and
encourage novel methods of producing known products.
TRIPS stipulates that members must award patents, "whether product or
process, in all fields of technology." 382 A developing country signatory to
TRIPS will have to extend product patent protection to previously excluded
subject matter. For example, inventions relating to food, drugs, chemical
processes, etc., will be protected by product patent protection in India.
Developing countries do not use product-by-process claims and lack claimdrafting mechanisms for patenting inventive processes of patent protected
products. Therefore, although novel processes are patentable under TRIPS,
developing countries will lack the mechanism to facilitate such patents.
This malady may result in generic drugs patentable in developed nations
being unprotected in developing nations.
D.

A Need Not to TRIP

Global welfare is never an excuse for local distress. Developed nations
need to carefully estimate local economics before forging international
policies. For example, in India only a mere 30% of the population has
secured access to modern medication despite the aggressive development of
the indigenous pharmaceutical industry. 383 The introduction of TRIPS is
likely to deprive even this 30% of access to drugs due to escalating costs.
This section analyzes the importance of the pre-TRIPS patent policy and

379. 974 F.2d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
380. Id. at 1281 (Rich, J., dissenting) (stating that "innovative R & D is not going to be
encouraged by the rule just laid down by the Atlantic Panel").
381. Patents Act, 1970 § 5 specifically relates to inventions relating to food, medicines and
chemicals, stating that "no patent shall be granted in respect of claims for the substances
themselves, but claims for the methods or processes ... shall be patentable." Id. Interestingly,
the Atlantic Thermoplastics case related to a chemical process. 970 F.2d at 835.
382. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 27.
383. Interview by Pharmabiz.com with Ranjit Shahani, President of Pharmaceutical
Producers Association of India (Dec. 6, 2001), at http://www.pharmabiz.com/
article/detnewsl.asp?articleid=l1345&sectionid=42; see also Pharmaceutical Research &
Manufacturers of America International, India: A Cautionary Tale on the CriticalImportance of
IP Protection, at http://www.phrma.org/intemational/ resources/12.04.2001.41 .cfm (last visited
Mar. 3, 2003).
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discusses the economics of pursuing the policy. Although India is used as a
case study, the same arguments apply for every developing country.
Between 1947 and 1970, foreign multinationals dominated the Indian
pharmaceutical industry. 384 The Indian government's move in 1954 to
develop an indigenous drug industry by establishing Hindustan Antibiotics
Ltd.385 was prompted by the density of disease in India.386 The patent
policy of 1970 dramatically changed this condition. 387 The present value of
the Indian pharmaceutical industry at 70 billion rupees dwarfs the mere 100
million rupees in 1947.388 Currently, 20,000 pharmaceutical manufacturers
are licensed in India. 389 Of the 500 bulk drugs used within India,
approximately 350 are manufactured within the country. 390 The Indian
pharmaceutical industry has emerged as a world leader in the production of
several bulk drugs. 391 Today, India is a major player in the international
generic drugs market. India also emerged as a reliable exporter of the
generic AIDS drugs during the South African AIDS crisis. 39 Even the
384. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
385. Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd. was founded in 1954. The company was established for
job creation and manufacturing life-saving drugs.
Currently, the company manufactures
seventy-eight formulations and four bulk drugs.
Hindustan Antiobiotics Ltd., at
http://www.hindantibiotics.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
386. See Sean Eric Smith, Opening Up to the World: India's PharmaceuticalCompanies
Preparefor 2005, ASIA PACIFIC RESEARCH CENTER PUBLICATION (Stanford Univ. Inst. for Int'l
Studies, Working Paper, 2000), available at http://ldml.stanford.edu/iispubsearch.iis?database=publ&-layout=view&-response=viewpub.html&-recordID=35337&-token.cntr=IIS&token.acro=A/PARC&-search; see also Ragavan, supra note 110.
387. See Ragavan, supra note 110.
388. Banerji, supra note 102, at 80.
389. Indian Pharmaceutical Industry: An Overview, Pharmaceutical and Drug
Manufacturers,
available
at
http://www.pharmaceutical-drug-manufacturers.com/
pharmaceutical-industry (last visited Apr. 17, 2003).
390. Id.
391. See Martin Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the PatentProvisions in
the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507, 525 (1996) (arguing
that strong intellectual property protection will be in India's interest given its infrastructure in
pharmaceutical production). Indian industry has emerged as a leader for the production of bulk
drugs like sulphamethoxazole and ethambutol. Indian production accounts for nearly 50% of
the world production. Several companies like Ranbaxy, Dr. Reddy's and Cipla have the
potential to become billion dollar companies within the next few years. Id. But see J.H.
Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to a Scholarly Debate, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 363, 374 (1996) (using the same data to argue that free-riding is a way
for a developing economy to accumulate the skills and capital necessary to become innovative).
392. See Michael Waldholz & Rachel Zimmerman, Bristol Myers Offers to Sell Two AIDS
Drugs in Africa Below Cost, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2001, at B1 (explaining that although Bristol
Meyers lowered their prices by 55%, it was still higher than the price of Indian drug
companies); see also Robert Block, Cipla Tries to Skirt South Africa AIDS-Drug Battle, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 9, 2001, at B6.
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United States considered
importing generic drugs from India during its
393
crisis.
Anthrax
recent
Most importantly, the patent policy of 1970 catered to the needs of the
Indian poor. Drug prices in India are among the cheapest in the world and
are affordable for the general population. On average, drugs manufactured
in India are more than 100% cheaper than the same drugs in the United
States. 394 Even generic drugs manufactured in the United States are
comparatively more expensive. 395 The government of India has achieved
the constitutional mandate of social and economic balance by setting a
maximum sale price while still leaving room for a reasonable profit. The
Indian government assures availability of patented drugs in the market by
retaining the power to compulsory license. Interestingly, the Indian
government has never used the compulsory licensing provision since the
enactment of the patent legislation.
However, the economic brunt of the 1970 patent policy has not escaped
India. Multinational companies, once major players, became reluctant to
sell in India.39 6 By 1997, multinational companies accounted for less than
30% of bulks and 20% of locally produced formulations. 397 Most
multinationals complied with the minimum requirements necessary to
393. See Manu Joseph, Indian Cipro Copies Don't Pay Off, WIRED NEWS (Nov. 8, 2001), at
http://www.wired.com/news/medtech/0,1286,48153,00.html. The cost of cipro was $.60 per
tablet eight years ago in India. The cost of cipro currently is $.04. Indian drug-makers export
the generic version of cipro to Russia, Brazil, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East at highly
competitive prices. Id.
394. See David Scondras, A Visit to India-Drug Prices, Research and Global Access,
BEING ALIVE, May 1999, at http://www.beingalivela.org/newsO599/0599%visittoindia.html
(arguing that drug prices in India are between 1000 to 4000% cheaper than the prices in the
United States). For example, the price of the antibacterial drug Norfloxacin at $.06 in India
compares to $12.26 in America. The anti-inflammatory drug Piroxicam costs less than $.05 in
India as against the American price of $. 115. AZT (azidovudine), a drug retailed for $.0582 per
300 mg, is sold in India in capsule form for $.0142; see also Banerji, supra note 102, at 83.
395. See generally Scondras, supra note 394 (arguing that American generic drugs are also
more expensive). Hytrin, a sophisticated anti-hypertensive, is sold in India for $.07 a tablet. A
month's supply of the drug costs about $4.20. This is the final price after adding a 200% profit
as allowed under the drug price control order. In the United States (Boston), the same drug
from the same company costs $44.48; Ranitidine (the generic equivalent of Zantac, an h-2
blocker which reduces stomach acid) costs $.42 for 150 mg in the United States. The exact
same product in India costs $.0179. Scondras notes that the American generic drug is 2346%
more expensive. Id. 1-3.
396. Multinational companies also could not match the price of the local companies. There
was no market for the patented versions when the locally manufactured generic versions were
sold at 100% below cost.
397. JEAN Q. LANJOUW, THE INTRODUCTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT PATENTS IN
INDIA: "HEARTLESS EXPLOITATION OF THE POOR AND SUFFERING?" 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.

Research, Working Paper No. 6366, 1998).
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maintain presence in the Indian market (such as producing simple
formulations from imported bulks), while awaiting stronger patent
protection. 398 As discussed in Part
II, the government responded by steadily
399
reducing price controls on drugs.
However, the limited purchasing power of the Indian public compels
cost effectiveness of pharmaceuticals. 4°° Given this impediment, the recent
amendments to the patent legislation should only marginally affect drug
prices.4 ° ' India has to concentrate on local welfare until appropriate means
are established for the entire population to access drugs.
E.

Patent Policies of Developed Nations Under Comparable
Circumstances

Developed nations have historically embraced protectionist policies and
weak patenting regimes to foster industrial development, followed by strong
patent regimes to sustain industrial growth. The Ayyangar Report 4°2 in
1959 pointed out that Germany's weak patent protection enabled the growth
of the German chemical industry.40 3 The U.K. in 1852 and the United
States in 1873 embraced protectionist policies in economies comparable to
that of the developing nations as discussed in Part 11.404 Canada refused to
grant pharmaceutical product patents until 1987 and maintained compulsory
licensing of pharmaceutical patents until 1991.405 The Japanese patent laws
of the 1950s, which governed the first twenty-year period in Japan
following World War II, provided only for process patents for
pharmaceutical industry. 40 6 As late as 1987, Japan was included along with
Mexico, Brazil, Taiwan, and Korea in the list of fifty-four countries cited by
398. See Smith, supra note 386.
399. See supra notes 153-159 and accompanying text. In 1970, most drugs were under
price control and by 1984 this was reduced to 347 drugs, and to 163 drugs in 1987. In 1994,
only 73 drugs remained under price control. See supra notes 153-159 and accompanying text.
400. Koshy, supra note 154 47.
401. Id.
402. RAJAGOPALA-AYYANGAR REPORT, supra note 129, at 24.

403. Id.
404. See supra Part II. America amended the patent statute in 1873 and later in 1952. The
patent legislation in England was enacted to encourage industries and developing local
manufacturing.
405. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies: The Need for
Improved PatentProtection Worldwide, 2 J.L. & TECH. 307, 320-21 (1987).
406. Koshy, supra note 154,
51. After the Japanese parliament determined that the
pharmaceutical industry lacked technical development capabilities, the government protected
these industries from foreign competition. This enabled the Japanese pharmaceutical industry to
create manufacturing capabilities and become highly competitive. Id.
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the United States International Trade Commission for inadequate patent
407
protection. 4°
Japan introduced pharmaceutical product patents only in
1975 and still retains the compulsory licensing provisions. 4 08 Even the
United States follows the strategy of establishing a patent regime to foster
industrial development and sustains growth with a strong patent regime.
The development of biotech patents in the United States is the
contemporary example showing that stringency in patent policies has been
commensurate with industrial development. The case of Diamond v.
Chakrabarthy40 9 in 1972 provided for the development of biotech industries
by holding that microorganisms are patentable subject matter under Title 35
U.S.C. § 101. A more positive attitude towards biotech patents was
witnessed in Amgen v. Chugai.410 In Amgen, the court held that conception
of a chemical compound cannot occur unless the inventor has "a mental
picture of the structure of the chemical, or is able to define it by its method
of preparation, its physical or chemical properties, or whatever
characteristics sufficiently distinguish it."' 411 Thus, the court enunciated the
4 12
doctrine of simultaneous conception and reduction to practice.
Additionally, the court did not invoke the requirement that the actual DNA
sequence be disclosed, but only that the DNA be defined in a manner
distinguishing it from other chemicals along with a description of how to
obtain it.4 13 This left the possibility of adequately describing ayarticular
DNA sequence even when the inventor is unaware of its structure. 14
The case of In re Deue 4 15 was one of the first steps the Federal Circuit
took to reduce application standards for biotech patents in favor of
applicants. 416 In Deuel, the court further reduced the standards from Amgen

407. Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of Intellectual
PropertyRights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 89, 102 (1993).
408. Koshy, supra note 154, 52.
409. 447 U.S. 303 (1972).
410. 927 F. 2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
411. Id. at 1206.
412. Id. The court stated that "[c]onception is the 'formation in the mind of the inventor, of
a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be

applied in practice."' Id. (internal citations omitted). Thus, the doctrine of simultaneous
conception and reduction to practice evolved to determine priority of invention. An inventor
may be unable to establish conception until the invention has been reduced to practice through
experimentation. Id.
413. Id.
414. The court merely required that the DNA sequence be disclosed in a manner that
sufficiently distinguishes it; the DNA sequence could be defined by its actual structure as well
as its method of preparation. Id.
415. 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
416. Id. at 1557-60; see also In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 784-85 (1993).

35:0117]

CAN'T WE ALL GET ALONG?

by minimizing the non-obviousness requirement. 4 17 The Federal Circuit
achieved this by defining the legal test of prima facie obviousness. The
invention in Deuel related to isolated and purified DNA and cDNA
molecules encoding heparin-binding growth factors (HBGF). 418 HBGFs
419
stimulate mitogenic activity and facilitate repair of damaged tissue.
Structural claims were used for the patent application. 420 The patent
examiner had cited a combined teaching of the Bohlen and Maniatis prior
art references to reject Deuel's application as prima facie obvious under
section 103.421 The court considered "whether the combination of a prior
art reference teaching a method of gene cloning, together with a reference
disclosing a partial amino acid sequence of a protein, may render DNA and
cDNA molecules encoding the protein prima facie obvious under section
103." 422 The court held that structural similarity between prior art
compounds and the claimed compound may provide a basis for an
obviousness rejection because the structural similarity establishes the
motivation to make the claimed compound.423 However, the court held that
although a general method of isolating DNA molecules is known, a specific
DNA molecule isolated is primafacie non-obvious and patentable. 4 24 The
impact of this decision made obviousness rejection less common for
biotechnology patents.425
Deuel enabled patenting of miniscule inventions by lowering the
obviousness bar. 426 Economically, this lowering of the obviousness
42 7
standard boosted the biotech companies.

417. Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1557-60. Deuel isolated and purified heparin-binding growth
factors (HBGF) from bovine uterine tissue, and determined the first twenty-five amino acids of
the N-terminal sequence. Id. at 1555. Deuel then isolated cDNA encoding for the bovine
HBGF by screening the bovine DNA library with an oligonucleotide probe. Id. Deuel purified
the cDNA and found that its sequence consisted of 1196 nucleotide base pairs. Id. The bovine
cDNA was then used as a probe to isolate and purify human placental HBGF. Id. Deuel
isolated, purified, and then determined the sequence of the human placental cDNA which
consisted of 961 nucleotide base pairs. Id. With this knowledge, Deuel predicted the complete
amino acid sequence of the human placental HBGF. Id.
418. Id. The claims on appeal were independent. See Id. at 1555.
419. Id. at 1554.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 1555-56.
422. Id. at 1557.
423. Id. at 1558.
424. Id. at 1559. "[T]he existence of a general method of isolating cDNA or DNA
molecules is essentially irrelevant to the question whether the specific molecules themselves
would have been obvious, in the absence of other prior art that suggests the claimed DNAs." Id.
425. Shraddha A. Upadhyaya, The Postmodern Written Description Requirements: An
Analysis of the Application of the Heightened Written Description Requirement to Original
Claims, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 65, 107-09 (2002).
426. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 517.
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On the one hand, based on prior art knowledge, the
biotechnologist knows that sequencing around twenty amino acids
is sufficient to obtain the cDNA sequence that codes for a,
particular protein, absent unforeseen difficulties. On the other
hand, under current law, the expected product of this scientifically
obvious manipulation is legally unobvious and thus patentable.42 8

Biotech companies scrambled to obtain patents by innovating and
inventing in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. 429 The Deuel decision
greatly helped the United States become the leader in biotechnology patent
applications and prosper from a rapidly growing biotechnology industry.43°
"The Chakrabarty and Deuel decisions were rendered in order to spur
biotechnology innovation and progress." 431 The result was a proliferation of
intellectual property rights in biomedical research.
However, the
disadvantage was the under-use of the resources by people as too many
owners blocked each other.432 The biotech industry was faced with "a spiral
of overlapping patent claims in the hands of different owners." 433 These
realities mandated that the free-for-all biotechnology patent application be
capped.434 This cap came in the form of the heightened written description
requirement in Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co.
("Eli Lilly").435 This case bridged the gap created by Deuel by using the
427. See Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, A Higher Nonobviousnes Standardfor Gene Patents:
ProtectingBiomedical Researchfrom the Big Chill, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROPER. L. REV. 143, 178
(2000); Upadhyaya, supra note 425, at 109.
428. Anita Varma & David Abraham, DNA Is Different: Legal Obviousness and the
Balance Between Biotech Inventors and the Market, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 53, 78 (1996).
429. Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 427, at 143.
430. Upadhyaya, supra note 425, at 109.
431. Id.
432. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in BiomedicalResearch, Sci. MAG., May 1, 1998, available at http://www.science
mag.org/cgi/content/full/280/5364/698.
433. Id.
434. Upadhyaya, supra note 425, at 109.
[B]etween 1990 and 1998, the total number of biotechnology patents granted
to U.S. corporations has quadrupled. In contrast, between 1990 and 1998,
the total number of patents issued increased by about sixty percent. This
large disparity is cause for concern. It suggests that the biotechnology
industry is using the relaxed nonobviousness standard to obtain genomic
patents simply for corporate gain.
Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 427, at 165.
435. 119 F.3d 1559, 1566-69 (1997); Upadhyaya, supra note 425, at 109. The University
of California ("UC") brought suit in 1990 against Eli Lilly alleging infringement of two patents
relating to recombinant DNA technology. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d. at 1562. Specifically, the patents
related to recombinant plasmids and microorganisms that produce human insulin. Id. Persons
unable to produce insulin suffer from diabetes. Id. Prior to recombinant technology for
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to limit the overly-broad biotechnology
written description requirement
436
rule.
Deuel
the
of
patents
Eli Lilly curbed the race for biotech patents by holding that a generic
description of the genus, such as "vertebrate insulin cDNA" or "mammalian
insulin cDNA," is an inadequate written description. 437 A generic written
description distinguishes the claimed genus only by function.438 A
functional definition is insufficient to define the genus because it merely
indicates what the gene does, rather than what it is. Genes should be
specifically defined. The structural features commonly possessed by
members of the genus distinguishing them from others should also be
defined. Thus, the court articulated the "precise definition" test. 4 39 The
Federal Circuit held that an adequate written description of a DNA
molecule should be comprised of "'a precise definition, such as by
structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties,' not a mere wish
or plan for obtaining the claimed chemical invention.' 44 0 Without the
heightened specificity requirement, a genus defined entirely by function is
an inadequate written description of the specification. 441 Prior to Eli Lilly,
the Federal Circuit, in Fiers v. Revel,442 had created an exception to the rule
that a claim included in the application cannot be rejected for lack of

producing human insulin to treat diabetes, animal insulin was used, which caused allergic
reactions. Id. The '525 patent issued from an application filed in 1977. Id. The '525 patent
related to proinsulin ("PI") and preproinsulin ("PPI") cDNA sequences in rats. Id. The '740
patent issued from an application filed in 1979. Id. at 1563. The '740 patent covered human PI
and PPI cDNA sequences, and tailoring techniques for the insertion of human PI cDNA into
recombinant plasmids. Id. Eli Lilly produced human PI by using semi-synthetic DNA to
produce a cleavable fusion protein. Id. The produced fusion protein consists of a bacterial
protein, a cleavable linkage having a single methionine residue and human Pl. Id. The human
PI was obtained by cleaving it from the fusion protein. The district court ruled that claims 1, 2,
and 4-7 in the '525 patent were invalid under section 112, paragraph 1 because the specification
did not provide an adequate written description of the cDNA covered in the claims. Id. The
Federal Circuit affirmed, basing its holding upon lack of written description. Id. at 1569.
436. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567.
437. Id. at 1568.
438. Lisa A Karczewski, Biotechnological Gene Patent Applications: The Implications of
the USPTO Written Description Requirement Guidelines on the Biotechnology Industry, 31
McGEORGE L. REV. 1043, 1078 (2000).
439. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1566, 1567 (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed.
Cir. 1993)).
440. Id. at 1567 (quoting Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171). An adequate writen description of a
DNA molecule "requires more than a mere statement that it is part of the invention and
reference to a potential method for isolating it; what is required is a description of the DNA
itself." Id. at 1566-67.
441. Karczewski, supra note 438, at 1078-79.
442. 984 F. 2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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description. 443 The Fiers court demanded specificity by holding that "while
one does not need to have carried out one's invention before filing a patent
application, one does need to be able to describe that invention with
particularity. 4 44 This rule was used effectively in the Eli Lilly case.
F.

A Post-September 11th Impression on Patents

The center of the global debate revolves around whether poverty and
density of diseases are adequate reasons warranting a more accommodating
patent regime. Developing nations traditionally support the argument. Out
of business interests, developed nations have been forced to reject the
arguments of the developing countries. The developed nations export goods
and services across the world. For example, in 1989 alone, estimates of
United States "exports of goods and services embodying intellectual
property amounted to nearly $60 billion., 445 Therefore, intellectual
property policies of developing nations impact heavily on business interests
of developed nations. 446 However, developed nations are likely to choose
the same policy options pursued by developing nations in comparable
circumstances. The United States government's reactions to the anthrax
crisis, and the American state governments' ("State") reactions to drug
prices under weak American economic conditions, strengthen the above
argument.
1.

Anthrax Crisis

The first case of anthrax in the United States was reported on October 4,
200 1.44 7 By November 2, 2001, the number of anthrax cases increased to
ten. 448 This increase necessitated immediate supply of anthrax drugs at an
affordable cost. The spread of anthrax was directly linked to bioterrorism
caused by the intentional release of bacillus anthracis spores. 449 As fear
gripped the North American continent, the United States and Canada took
significant steps to make the anthrax drug affordable to the public. Public
networks advised the people who panicked in the face of bioterrorism to
443. Id. at 1171; ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 611.
444. Fiers,984 F.2d at 1169.
445. Pechman, supra note 5, at 183.
446. Id.
447. John A. Jemigan et al., Bioterrorism-RelatedInhalationAnthrax: The First 10 Cases
Reported in the United States, EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES, Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 933, 934,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol7no6/jernigan.htm.
448. Id.
449. Id.
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take the affordable generic doxycycline. 450 Meanwhile, Canada, a long and
a trusted ally of the United States, canvassed the generic drug market.45 '
The United States considered the option of compromising business interests
by buying generic versions of ciprofloxin from India.452 The possibility of
importing low cost generic ciprofloxin from India was debated.453 The
United States government contemplated federally appropriating the Bayer
Inc., patent in ciprofloxin to manufacture the drug. 454 This federal
appropriation of intellectual property rights is termed compulsory licensing
in developing countries. 455 The steps taken by the United States and
Canada were meant to produce the same effect produced by the drug price
control order in India.Y56 A mere sixty cases of one infectious disease
moved these patent-pillar nations to compromise business interests for
public health.
Developing countries house a sizable percentage of
population with various diseases. Expecting developing countries to place
the business interests of developed nations ahead of local public health
issues is impractical.
2.

Price Control by the States

The economic downfall during the Bush administration dried the tax
revenues of the States.457 The decreased tax revenues left the States the
choice of either providing less funds for state programs catering to the poor

450. E.g., Mellinda T. Willis, Officials Move Toward Doxycycline as First-Line Anthrax
Treatment, ABC NEWS.COM, Oct. 30, 2001, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/living/
DailyNews/doxycycline0 11030.html.
451. See Amy Harmon & Robert Pear, Canada Overrides Patent for Cipro to Treat
Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at Al (reporting that Canada overrode Bayer's patent for
ciprofloxin and ordered a million tablets of the generic version from a Canadian company).
452. Joseph, supra note 393; see also Reuters Health, Indian PharmaceuticalCompanies
Preparedto Provide Generic Cipro (Oct. 25, 2001), at http://www.infectioncontroltoday.com/
hotnews/lah2511050.html.
453. Joseph, supra note 393. Senator Charles Schumer approached Ranbaxy Laboratories,
a generic drug company based in India, to check availability of the generic version of
ciprofloxin at low cost. Id.
454. Id.
455. See id. Dilip Shah, a pharmaceutical consultant from India opines that the United
States government's move to attempt to federally appropriate the Bayer patent in ciprofloxin is
an admission of the position of developing countries that health considerations rank above
business interests. Id.
456. See supra Part II.C. 1.b (explaining that price control on drugs evolved to increase
more accessibility of medication to the public).
457. Russell Gold et al., States Square Off Against Drug Firms in Crusade on Prices,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2001, at Al.

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J..

or confronting the cost of drugs. 458 Florida made the first move in 2000 by
urging drug companies participating in the Medicaid program to provide
special rebates. 459 Under federal law, pharmaceutical companies charge the
same price to the States and preferred customers for Medicaid supplies.46 °
The States were left with the option of price control unless residents without
drug coverage were offered discounts. 46 1 Hence, Florida mandated drug
companies to provide an additional 6% price discount. Maine restricted
Medicaid access to expensive drugs. Maine held its position successfully in
a challenge made by the drug companies.462 Michigan took a step further
and proposed to set a low common denominator for drug prices. 4 63 These
measures were meant to protect public health by making drugs affordable.
The falling economy and the anthrax incidents tested the patent system at
a difficult time. It is hard to argue that the system did not fail. Even the
strongest proponents of patents like the United States stepped outside the
box for a solution. Even the rich, patent-friendly nations consider patent
restricting options to protect public health. Given this, TRIPS posits a
strategically losing argument in forcing impoverished nations swamped by
diseases to pay patented prices for drugs. In doing so, TRIPS provides
primacy to business interests and ignores the public health perspective. To
be workable, a patent policy needs to account for local needs and realities.
V.

UNREALISTIC ESTIMATES COSTING THE DEVELOPED NATION

Developed nations have been unrealistic in estimating the workability of
the patent policy in TRIPS. The effect of people's reaction to TRIPS patent
policy in developing countries has been ignored in estimating its success.
Although the United States emerged successful in encouraging the
developing nations to embrace the TRIPS regime, it resulted in a heavy loss
458. Id.
459. Id. In August 2001, drug companies filed a case challenging the Florida program. Id.;
see also Russell Gold et al., PharmaceuticalIndustry Sues Michigan to Block Attempt to Cut
Drug Prices,WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at A2.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 85 (5th Cir. 2001)
(challenging the Maine Rx program). A federal appeals court ruled in favor of Maine. Id. The
U. S. Supreme Court, in October 2001, indicated that it may take up the case and has invited the
Solicitor General to file briefs. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 534 U.S. 947
(2001) (mem.); see also Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 219, 221
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (contending that the federal government overstepped its authority in allowing
Vermont seniors and uninsured residents not otherwise eligible for Medicaid to avail themselves
of the program's low drug prices). The federal appeals court held in favor of PhRMA. Id.
463. See Gold, supra note 457.
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to the interests of the developed nations. The TRIPS patent policy has
resulted in the loss of stature for the United States and the loss of markets
for the pharmaceutical industry. Industries other than the pharmaceutical
industry also lost since the heightened stress over the pharmaceutical issue
enabled non-pharmaceutical sectors to quietly slip away. 46 The following
section analyzes the costs and benefits of enforcing the current patent policy
in developing nations to audit the monetary and strategic losses for the
developed nations. Further, the discussion centers on the issue of whether
the developed nations exaggerated estimates and incorrectly weighed
alternatives leading to the failure of the intellectual property policies in
drugs.
A.

Voice of the People

The reactions of people in developing countries are an important factor
in the workability of the TRIPS patents policy. This section highlights the
possible reactions and their effects on the successful implementation of the
TRIPS patent policy.
1. Cost of Drugs Leading to Parallel Markets
The imposition of the patent policy in TRIPS will immediately increase
the cost of drugs. For example, the anti-cancer drug vincristine, currently
available for the equivalent of $.40 in India, will be sold for $8.465 Vast
percentages of people live below a monthly income of $8. The indigenous
drug industry will face a setback raising unemployment levels. Poverty
coupled with unemployment will result in new and old drugs being denied
to the needy because of cost. 466 Lack of domestic industrialization will
increase the cost of all other commodities. Amidst this, local patent
applications will be low since scientists cannot be expected to become
patent savvy overnight. Patented products from abroad will be affordable
only to the rich, resulting in an even bigger divide between the rich and the
poor.
464. For example, specified sectors in developing nations like the Indian computer industry
have progressed enough to move towards a patent regime. These industrial sectors would not
have directly affected the general public and actually presented a higher chance for successful
implementation. See discussion infra notes 564-565.
465. Banerji, supra note 102, at 83.
466. Interview by the Trade and Development Centre with O.P. Grover, Director, Indian
Drug Manufacturers Association, B.K Raizada, Vice President, Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited,
and Ajit Yadav, Legal Services Director, Ranbaxy Laboratories
Limited, at
http://www.itd.org/issues/india5a.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2003).
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The natural corollary is for the development of alternate markets to cater
to the millions of needy people. The Indian drug industry itself evolved as :a
reaction to the unaffordable cost of foreign drugs. Even doctors in India
prefer to prescribe the generic drug alternative to high cost patented
drugs.467 Faced with an ailing patient with no means of affording the
patented product, medical practitioners in developing nations will rarely
refrain from providing the generic substitute. 468 Ironically, the development
of an alternate market is precisely what the TRIPS patent policy was
designed to stop. Theoretically, it can be argued that increasing the
implementation will eliminate pirating markets. Realistically, however,
such attempts in developing countries will only lead to corruption. 469
2.

Unrest in Developing Nations

A future bonanza of increased domestic and foreign investment will be
inconsequential to people unable to afford a medication to cure an ailment.
If people are unable to accommodate the increased cost, there is potential
for unrest to restore original policies. Several countries already have
witnessed such unrests turning into vigorous protests. 4 7° Protests against
Monsanto 47 1 and PepsiCo 472 in India increased the hostility of people and
restricted growth. The protests in India tri R ered several protests against
Monsanto in Philippines and Bangladesh.
There were also several
protests against Monsanto in Brazil based on the intellectual and
environmental issues.4 74 These protests have increased the hostility of
467. Koshy, supra note 154, 48.
468. Id.
469. See Harvey E. Bale Jr., Patent ProtectionAnd PharmaceuticalInnovation, 29 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 95, 100 (1996-1997). Bale argues that "inadequate intellectual property
protection is really disguised protectionism for local industry." Id. Such protection is another
basis for the corruption of public officials. Id.
470. Henrique Freire de Oliveira Souza, Genetically Modified Plants: A Need for
InternationalRegulation, 6 ANN. SURV. INT'L & CoMP. L. 129, 142-44 (2000).
471. See Institute for Global Communications, Monsanto 's Cremation Starts In Karnataka,
(Nov. 28, 1998), at http://liberated.tao.ca/monsantocremation.htm. The farmers lobby in India
was termed "Operation Cremation Monsanto." This lobby accused Monsanto of trying to
withhold information from the farmers. Id.
472. Sakuntola Narasimhen, Tandoori v. Kentucky Fried, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR
(January/February 1996), at http://multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/mm0196.03htm (last visited
Mar. 17, 2003).
473. Institute for Global Communications,

Thousands of Asia Farmers May "Evict"

Monsanto in Philippines, (Aug. 22, 2002), at http://www.organicconsumers.org/monsanto/
asiaeviction.cfm.
474. See Freire de Oliveira Souza, supra note 470, at 155-56. On June 15, 1998,
"Monsanto initiated the process for the commercial exploitation in Brazil of the Soy Roundup
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people and restricted the growth of the companies and the countries housing
them. The unrestcreated by the protests influences government stability
and stunts investment opportunities.475 The object of establishing the WTO
to further trade will be defied if trade between the developed and
developing countries is adversely affected.
3.

Pressured Third World Governments

Governments in third world countries can do very little to enforce
policies rejected by the people. Frustrations generated by the inability to
deal with issues will force governments to either ignore implementation or
renounce the policy itself; both results are detrimental to the developed
nations. Several developing nations like Brazil, India, and South Africa
yielded initially to international pressures but later renounced the policy
under local pressures. For example, the Brazilian Health Minister forced
more concessions after threatening to compulsorily license patented
drugs. 476 Strong protests in New Delhi forced India to lead the campaign in
Doha to gain concessions from the WTO.4 77 After a chapter full of begging,
pleading, and reasoning with the world, South Africa renounced patents in
pharmaceuticals at a stage when the Pretoria regime of South Africa was
fully aware that the magnitude of the AIDS crisis forced the world to go
4 78
with it.
Ready." Id. at 155. This is the "soy modified genetically for added tolerance to the pesticide
glyphosate." Id. Monsanto applied for the relevant authorization from CTNBio-the Brazilian
Patent Office. Id. On December 30, 1998, CTNBio, through an internal enactment (Instrucao
Normativa No. 18, D.O. No. 250-E, de 30 de dezembro 1998), authorized the commercial
exploitation of the Soy Roundup Ready by the Brazilian subsidiary of U.S. Monsanto Co.Monsanto do Brasil Ltda. Id. at 156. This led to several protests in Brazil. Id.
475. See supra notes 451-452, 455 and accompanying text. About 25,000 protestors
marched the streets of New Delhi to oppose WTO negotiations that were underway resulting in
severe political pressure on the government. This is quoted as the reason for the stand India
took in Qatar. Helene Cooper & Geoff Winestock, Poor Nations Win Gains in Global Trade
Deal as U.S. Compromises, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2001, at Al.
476. Consumer Project on Technology, Ministry of Health Announces Compulsory
Licensing of Nelfinavir Patent (Aug. 22, 2001), at http://www.cptech.org/ip/
health/c/brazil/nelfD 8222001.html; see also Miriam Jordan, Brazil To Break Roche Patent On
AIDS Drug, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2001, at A3.
477. See Helene Cooper & Geoff Winestock, Poor Nations Win Gains in Global Trade
Deal as U.S. Compromises, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2001, at Al. The role of India's Commerce
and Industry Minister, Murasoli Maran, was pivotal in the resulting negotiations in the WTO in
the Qatar session. Murasoli Maran's strong stance was in part a result of the political pressures
the government faced in India. Strong protests were also witnessed in India a few days before
the WTO session. Id.
478. See Charlotte Denny, A Spoonful Of Sugar Will Not Help, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 19,
2001), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/aids/story/0,7369,475344,00.html; see also
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Trade and export issues have bestowed developed nations with a better
bargaining position over developing countries. Advocating unfriendly
policies will push developing countries into economic crisis and unrest.
Developing countries subjected to international pressure on one side and
public health crisis on the other will either isolate or rebel. This may result
in the developed nations losing their hold over the developing nations.
Finally, the 9 world will create for itself more Afghanistans and
47
Argentinas.
B.

The Lost Winner

The deceptive win of the developed nations in encouraging developing
countries to participate in a patent regime resulted in a lose-lose situation
for the developed and the developing nations. International issues forced
America to soften its original stance towards developing nations,
particularly vis-d-vis drug patents. 480 America was characterized as the
global villain and pushed to a defensive position. America had no
alternative but to replenish its tarnished image. This section does not
discuss the correctness of the characterization. It merely argues that the
effort to replenish its tarnished image cost America heavily. This section
examines the strategy to identify areas leading to a loss for the developed
nations.
1. Loss of Stature
America has lost its powerful bargaining stature amidst developing
nations.
a. South Africa
In 1996, South Africa highlighted the extent of AIDS and requested
access to drugs. 481 The then American trade representative, Mr. Papovich,
treated it as a routine matter and asked South Africa to comply with TRIPS
Miriam Jordan, Brazil May Flout Trade Laws To Keep AIDS Drugs Free For Patients, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 12, 2001, atB1.
479. These are examples of countries isolated because of economic and political instability.
480. John Donnelly, Brazil to Break AIDS Drug Patent, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 23, 2001, at
51, available at http://www.globaltreatmentacess.org/content/press-release/a01/082301_BG
CL.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). These include the AIDS issues in South Africa,
Thailand, Brazil and in other developing nations detailed in this paper. See supra Part II.C.
481. Helene Cooper et al., AIDS Epidemic Traps Drug Firms in a Vise: Treatment vs.
Profits, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2001, at Al.
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immediately. 482 Fearing trade sanctions, South Africa passed the Medicines
and Related Substances Act of 1997. This Act authorized parallel
importing and compulsory licensing. 4 83 The health minister was vested
with powers to compulsorily license patents in a public health crisis. In
1998, the United States denied South Africa the permission to export under
the generalized system of preference scheme (GSP) unless the 1997 act was
amended.484 In April of 1999 the United States included South Africa in the
annual "watch list."
In July 1999, a team from the United States visited Cape Town to discuss
TRIPS compliance.485 At the time, one in every five South Africans was
infected with AIDS 4 86 and South Africa accounted for a total of 26 million
of the world's 36 million HIV affected patients. 487 In seven countries in
southern Africa, at least 20% of adults had HIV. Botswana accounted for
the highest percentage of the disease with 35.8% infected adults. 488 The
extent of AIDS forced the United States to amend its policy within a month.
President Clinton "issued an executive order to promote access to
HIV/AIDS medicines in South Africa." 489 By December of 1999, the
United States trade office issued a statement extending the South African
policy to all poor countries. 49 Thus, the United States put itself in a
defensive position, which set off a chain reaction. Developing countries
accused the United States of forcing inhumane policies. AIDS activists and
public health groups severely condemned the United States.
b.

Thailand

Thailand reported its first case of AIDS in 1984. Within ten years, a
million people were infected. 49 1 The 1979 patent legislation did not provide
patent protection to drugs and thus facilitated generic drugs. Thailand was
included in the United States "watch list" in 1989. 492 The United States
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. Id. Pretoria sought additional benefits under the generalized system of preference
scheme. This scheme allows poor countries to export products to the U.S. at reduced duties. Id.
485. Id.
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Rosalyn S. Park, The InternationalDrug Industry: What the Future Holds for South
Africa's HIV/AIDS Patients, II MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 125, 138 (2002).
490. Id.
491. Rosemary Sweeney, The U.S. Push for Worldwide PatentsProtectionfor Drugs Meets
the AIDS Crisis in Thailand: A Devastating Collision, 9 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 445, 446

(2000).
492. Id.
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threatened to impose sanctions unless amendments were introduced before
November of 1989. 493 By 1991, Thailand was moved to the "priority watch
list"-a status the United States imposed on countries grossly violating
intellectual property rights. This pressure forced Thailand to amend its
The 1992 patent act created the
patent legislation in 1992. 494
Pharmaceutical Patent Board ("Board") with compulsory licensing powers
in a public health crisis. The Board had the power to control prices by
seeking pricing and cost information of drugs. The United States was
dissatisfied with the amendments and continued to place Thailand in the
"priority watch list." Thailand feared economic retaliation since America is
Thailand's largest export market.495 In 1997, Thailand suffered a severe
economic crisis resulting in additional reliance on American exports.
America used the opportunity to negotiate patent amendments. TRIPS
compliant amendments were made to the Thai patent legislation in 1999.
The patent friendly amendments, however, resulted in a public health crisis.
The cost of drugs increased by several fold and access to critical drugs were
to
denied to poor people. By 2000 about 3% of the population was reported
496
have AIDS, which became the leading cause of death among Thais.
America had to reconsider its policy again. By January 27, 2000, a
United States trade representative office indicated that, "[i]f the Thai
government determines that issuing a compulsory license is required to
address its health care crisis, the US will raise no objections, provided the
compulsory license is issued in a manner fully consistent with the WTO
TRIPS Agreement. 497
c.

Brazil

The precedent established by South Africa and Thailand aided Brazil.
Brazil complied with TRIPS by amending its patent law in 1996.498 The
amended act vested the power to compulsorily license patented product not
worked locally. 499 The United States argued that the local manufacturing

requirement in Brazil's amended patent law violated TRIPS. Therefore, the

493. Id.
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Id.
497. Susannah Markandya, Timeline of Trade Disputes Involving Thailand and Access to
Medicines (July 23, 2001), at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/thailand.html.
498. Brazil Industrial Property-Law No. 9279 of May 14, 1996.
499. Id.
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United States requested
WTO to establish a dispute resolution panel and
50 0
review the dispute.
Meanwhile, spending $303 million per annum on a single antiretroviral
drug pushed Brazil to its economic limit. Brazilian officials launched a
vigorous campaign against the United States position. Brazil requested
Roche, to reduce the cost of the antiretroviral drug. However, Roche,
50 1
refused to even consider anything more than a 30% reduction in price.
Unable to face the expenses, Brazil openly renounced drug patents in 2001
and challenged the developed nations by threatening to compulsorily license
antiretroviral drugs. 50 2 Roche negotiated a 70% cost reduction to continue
supplying the drug. 50 3 The Office of the United States Trade Representative
issued a statement pledging his cooperation to combat AIDS,50 4 and the
United States dropped claims against Brazil in the WTO.5 °5
d. India
India passed the first patent amendment in 1999 in response to American
pressure. India neither implemented the first amendment to the fullest nor
passed the more crucial second amendment. 50 6 In the meantime, events in
South Africa and Brazil increased the demand for generic drugs. After
being on the defensive for not amending patent laws, India gained an
offensive position and pointed to American insensitivity to poverty. India
assumed the lead position in the Qatar meeting of the WTO and gained
concessions for developing nations. 507

500. Press Release, U.S. Department of State, U.S., Brazil Withdraw HIV/AIDS dispute
from WTO Litigation (June 25, 2001), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/
group8/summit0 1/wwwh0 1065212.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2003).
501. Jennifer Rich, Roche Reaches Accord on Drug with Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2001,
at C1.
502. Id.
503. Id.; see also Paulo Reb8lo, Brazil Targets Another AIDS Drug, WIRED NEWS, (Aug.
29, 2001), at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,46353,00.html. See generally Roche
Surprised by Authorities' Declaration, MEDICINE-NEWS.COM (Aug. 24, 2001), at
http://www.roche.com/med-corp-detail-2001 ?id=686.
504. U.S. Dep't of State, U.S., Brazil Withdraw HIV/AIDS Dispute from WTO Litigation
(June 25, 2001), at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/group8/summit01/wwwh01062512 .html.
505. Helene Cooper, US. Drops WTO Claim Against Brazilian Patent Law, WALL ST. J.,
June 26, 2001, at B7.
506. See supra Part IlI.B.
507. See supra note 477 and accompanying text.
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Monetary Loss

The loss of stature discussed above was not the only loss for the United
States. The American government 5° 8 and the drug industry lost monetarily.
The drug industry granted concessions in existing markets, lost potential
density markets and the lost future deals until 2016, as detailed below. The
faulty strategy of the drug industry also became a blessing to the genericdrug industry.
a. Drug Industry Loss In Existing Markets
In South Africa, Bristol Myers reduced prices of two HIV medicines
from $3589 per annum to $54.509 Merck dropped the price of two
antiretroviral drugs, Crixivan (indinavir sulfate) and Stocrin (efavirenz),
from $6000 to $600 and $500 respectively. 510 Glaxo SmithKline PLC
Roche Holdings AG lowered
offered Combivir at $730 from $6289."' 512
prices by more than 90% of the original cost.
Roche's offer to Brazil to cut 13% of the cost of antiretroviral triggered
Brazilian officials to dismiss drug patents "when companies employ[]
abusive pricing policies.' '513 Prompted by the threat to compulsorily license
AIDS drugs, Merck slashed prices of two AIDS drugs by 65% and 59% in

508. The American government provided funding to either check epidemics or to replenish
its tarnished image. For example, the United States government funded $480 million to South
Africa to contain AIDS. This sum was provided in foreign assistance. Moreover, the United
States promised a sum of $200 million to fight AIDS in Africa. The Secretary of State
promised additional sums in the wake of a United Nations' estimate that a few billion dollars
annually would be required. Additionally, Thailand now relies on the United States and the
other developed nations to fund its AIDS program. See Michael M. Phillips, Rapt Powell Hears
of AIDS Suffering, WALL ST. J. EUR., May 29, 2001, at 2; see also Bill Nichols, Africans Hold
Powell To A High Standard,USA TODAY, May 29, 2001, at 6A.
509. See Sarah Bosley, EmbarrassedFirms Slash AIDS Drug Prices,THE GUARDIAN (Mar.
12, 2001), at http://www.guardian.co.uk/aids/story/0,7369,450388,00.html; see also Charlotte
Denny, A Spoonful of Sugar Will Not Help, THE GUARDIAN, (Apr. 19, 2001), at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/aids/story/0,7369,475344,00.html; Gardiner Harris, AIDS Gaffes in
Africa Come Back to Haunt the Drug Industry at Home, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2001, at Al.
Interestingly, Bristol Meyers lowered its price beyond cost and Merck lowered its price cost by
55% to compete with the prices offered by an Indian drug company, Cipla Pharmaceuticals.
Michael Waldholz & Rachel Zimmerman, Bristol Myers Offers to Sell Two AIDS Drugs in
Africa Below Cost, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2001, at B1.
510. Bosley, supra note 509.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Alex Bellos, Roche Bows to Brazil on Aids Drug, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 1, 2001), at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,545328,00.html.
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Brazil to avoid competition from generic drugs. 514 This resulted in Roche
cutting prices by another 40%, finally selling the drug at 70% of the original
Cost.

b.

Drug Industry -Loss of Markets

The strategic mistake of the business interest groups of developed
nations is costly to the huge Indian market. The unrealistic pricing of
imported drugs at the outset caused the development of the indigenous
generic-drug industry in India. Today, the Indian generic drugs compete
with American patented drugs internationally.
Foreign pharmaceutical companies had another opportunity to invest in
India when the Indian government reduced drug price controls to encourage
foreign investment in pharmaceuticals. Instead of realistically strategizing,
drug companies like Hoechst, Glaxo, and Pfizer increased the prices for
bulk drugs. People protested vigorously and took to the streets. A public
interest writ was instituted in the Supreme Court of India alleging violation
of constitutional rights. 51651Since health care is a constitutional issue,517 the
Supreme Court of India directed the government to deposit the excess profit
of the drug companies amounting to $400,000 into the Drug Prices
Equalizing Account. 518 In the 1993 balance sheet, Pfizer earmarked nearly
$1 million to pay back the government. 5 19 The government terminated the
plan in 1986 and restored price control. 520 The big loss for the drug
companies was not the minimal penalty, but the loss of an opportunity to
capture the India market.

514. Melody Petersen with Jennifer L. Rich, Roche Asks for Meeting With Brazil Health
Minister, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2001, at C2.
515. Rich, supra note 501.
516. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution provides for right to life. See supra notes 141143 and accompanying text. Several supreme court judgments have interpreted this to include
the right to a healthy life. The court has held that right to a healthy life is a part of the 'basic
structure' of the Constitution. Kesavananda Bharathi v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461,
1463.
517. See supra note 142.
518. Amitava Guha, Price Control Of Drugs In India- An Overview, HEALTH LIBR., Jan.
2001, at http://www.healthlibrary.com/reading/rdb/uly98/price.htm.
519. Id.
520. Id.
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Loss From Doha

The Declaration in Doha ("Declaration") marks a retreat for
multinational drug companies. 521 The WTO recognized the gravity of
public health problems afflicting developing countries and granted
concessions. 52 2 The Declaration specifically dilutes the vigor of the TRIPS
agreement. Clause 4 of the Declaration 523 states that:
[T]he TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members
from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while
reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm
that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all.524
Clause 5 incorporates the right to grant compulsory licenses
and the
525
licenses.
such
granting
for
grounds
the
determine
to
freedom
With respect to pharmaceutical products, the least-developed
country members will not be obliged to implement or apply the
TRIPS agreement, part II sections 5 and 7 or to enforce rights
provided for under these sections until January 1, 2016.
Additionally, the members can seek extensions of the transition
periods provided in Article 66 (1) of the TRIPS agreement.526
Clause 6 also "recognizes that WTO members with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties
in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS
agreement. ' ' 527 Moreover, the Council for TRIPS has to provide a solution
enabling generic drug industries to these members by the end of 2002.528
The Declaration will embolden countries to challenge the drug industry
if the cost of drugs becomes unaffordable. 529 The wide definition of drugs
in the Declaration diminishes the line between important and necessary
drugs. 530 Thus, even the cost of non-AIDS drugs can be challenged. The
521. Declarationon TRIPS Agreement and Public Health at Qatar,supra note 311.
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Id.
528. Id.
529. Gardiner Harris & Rachel Zimmerman, Drug Makers Say WTO Setback Will Not Have
SignificantImpact, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2001, at A3.
530. Id.
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Declaration also creates an official exception for the operation of the
generic drug industry during a patent term. 531 Clause 1 recognizes the
"special needs" of developing and least developed nations articulated in the
preamble of the TRIPS agreement.53 Furthermore, developing nations can
use the flexibility in Clause 5 to combat epidemics. The term "epidemics"
is widely defined enabling developing nations to decide whether an
epidemic is prevalent based on national standards. 533 Developing countries
can also determine which diseases and when the "identified" diseases
translate into a public health crisis.534
The drug industry cannot profitably market in least-developed nations
until at least 2016. 3 This deprives the industry of an opportunity to
effectively incorporate these nations into the product patent regime. Now
the drug industry fears that consumers in developed nations will take a cue
from these international incidents and demand commensurate prices. Such
a move will impact the survival,536 research, and development activity of
the drug industry.537
C.

ImpracticalAssumptions andInadequate Alternatives

Developed nations have mistakenly made the western model the norm to
tackle unique global issues. Decades have passed since developed nations
tackled issues similar to those in developing nations. Hence, developed
nations lack an understanding of the fact that developing countries cannot
sacrifice their ailing millions for fear of trade sanctions. In a self-absorbed
momentum, developed nations dismissed the objections of developing
53
nations and advocated the TRIPS agreement patent policy impractically. W
A realistic assessment of the issues is necessary to successfully harmonize
patent policies.
Scholarly works in developed nations tend to lack depth in appreciating
realities. Discussion among experts is a little stifled and reflects a tacit
intellectual refusal to understand the difficulties of implementing patent
531. Id.
532. Declarationon TRIPS Agreement and Public Health at Qatar,supra note 311.
533. Id. Clause 5(c) highlights that a public health crisis can result in a national emergency.
Id.
534. Id.
535. Id.
536. See sources cited supra note 232; infra note 541.
537. John Carey & Amy Barrett, Drug Prices-What's Fair?-How Can We Encourage
Research And Still Keep Prices Within Reach . . . for Cipro And Beyond, Bus. WK., Dec. 10,
2001, at 61.
538. Id.
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policies without adequate infrastructure as discussed below. Hence, the
theoretical assessment :by developed nations of the workability of the
demands of the TRIPS agreement is practically flawed.
George Foster (in analyzing India) suggests that, "[d]rug consumers in
India seem to be somewhat better organized and more political than their
counterparts in the [United States] as they have been extremely vocal. in
their opposition to patent reform from the beginning and have taken part in
massive protests with other anti-GATT demonstrators." 539
This
academically logical argument lacks understanding of the systems in
developing countries. Poor people do not function by organization.
Impoverished people with nothing to hold onto figure they lose nothing in
challenging their governments. Lacking the economic power to fight in an
organized manner they take to the streets.54 ° The best example of this is the
54 1
recent behavior of people of Argentina in the wake of economic crisis.
There was no organized effort to protest, but people facing the same
difficulties united quickly. The Argentineans are by no means more
organized than the Americans-they are merely more upset with their
governments. Governments in developing countries are aware of this and
fear the people's power rather than sanctions by GATT or the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Foster's suggestion that "[iut is hard to imagine that
the members of any ruling party would feel comfortable running the risk of
incurring IMF disfavor, facing rescission of GATT benefits, and risking
possible unilateral U.S. trade sanctions" lacks appreciation of functional
realities. 542 Although developing nations are criticized as short-sighted for
daring the IMF and GATT, the failure of the IMF policy in Argentina,
leading poor Argentina finally to the streets, is a lesson
not to attempt
543
uniformity in policies without accounting for diversities.
539. Foster, supra note 232, at 309.
540. See supra notes

469-74

and

accompanying

text

(discussing

translation

of

discontentment in developing nations into unrest).
541. Lucia Newman, Argentina Teeters on Possible Economic Collapse, CNN.coM, Dec.

21, 2001, at World Section, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/12/20/argentina
(last visited Mar. 17, 2003). Severe economic crisis in Argentina resulted in thousands of
people taking to the streets of the capital. This was in protest of the government's handling of
the country's worsening economic crisis forcing Mr. De la Rua, the economic minister, to
resign. Id.
542. Foster, supra note 232, at 332.
543. See, Ana I. Eiras & Bret D. Schaefer, Argentina's Economic Crisis: An 'Absence of
Capitalism,' The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder (Ctr for Int'l Trade and Econ.) (Apr. 19,
2001), availableat http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bgl432.html,

explaining that:

IMF shares the blame for Argentina's current malaise. The history of IMF
lending to Argentina since 1983 . . . shows nearly continuous funding
accompanied by policy recommendations.
While some of these
recommendations may have helped to liberalize the economy, most hindered
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Commentators from developed nations examining India in the post
TRIPS period point to Congress (I)'s loss of majority in the upper house as
a catalyst for India's failure to enact implementing legislation.
Practically
no party in India could have amended and implemented the patent
legislation and hoped to survive in power. People would have rallied
against any government taking away access to drugs. Foster also adds that
if the Indian electorate "is not in the midst of a financial crisis . . ., [it] is
much more likely to support a nationalist party known for its anti-Western
rhetoric than is an electorate going to the polls during such a crisis." 545 In
reality, most developing countries are amidst financial crisis as can be seen
in their economies. 546 Electorates in developing countries care most for
their daily source of income and they perceive, however unreasonably,
patent reform as an immediate threat to it. Foster's criticism that India uses
poverty as an excuse without appreciating pharmaceutical patents is just as
absurd as criticizing the United States government for not appreciating the
Bayer patent when the Anthrax fear was at its peak.547
Another scholarly work warns that, "without adequate implementation,
the United States will not attain its goal of externalizing its strong
intellectual property protection through TRIPS" without establishing
logistics of implementation. 548
Other scholars caution additional
impediments because "the GATT/TRIPS is skewed toward the developing
countries . . . . For example, there is an emphasis on recognizing the
'special needs' of the least developed countries.,, 549 Developed nations
are
likely to make a costly mistake unless they understand the systems and
special needs of developing nations and work around them.
economic growth, and the reliability of IMF loans encouraged moral hazard.
After almost two decades of misguided recommendations and nearly
continuous funding, the IMF's involvement in Argentina actually
strengthened the power of political vested interests at the expense of

economic growth.
Id.
544. Foster, supra note 232, at 319-21.
545. Id. at 322.
546. Amongst countries that have been encouraged to follow intellectual property policies
and pay the cost of branded drugs are: Ethiopia, with a per capita gross domestic product (GDP)
of $560; Eritrea, with a GDP of $750; Somalia, with a GDP of $600; Tanzania, with a GDP of
$550; Zambia, with a GDP of $880. Along with these African nations, there are other
developing nations, such as India, with 320 million people living below the poverty index;
Brazil, with 20 million impoverished AIDS patients; and several others. See Country Profiles,
The Int.'l Intellectual Prop. Inst., PATENT PROTECTION AND ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS
PHARMACEUTICALS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 59-99 (2000).
547. Id.; see also supra Part IV.F. I (discussing United States anthrax scare).
548. Pechman, supra note 5, at 179.
549. Sabatelli, supra note 6, at 603.
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There is an increased need to be open to third world realities. Developed
nations tend more towards unrealistic assessments merely reiterating their
stance.550 Scintillating arguments vouching for the correctness of policies is
inadequate for developed nations to achieve patent harmonization.
Developed nations ought to encourage criticisms and be aware of
undesirable effects. Knowledge of the various facets of the issues in
developing nations is key to forging favorable policies.
1.

Limiting Alternatives

Assuming that developing nations refuse to fall within the patent regime,
the developed world is left with the singular alternative of pressuring
countries by creating the fear of trade sanctions. Theoretically, this fear
makes a formidable argument. 55' In reality, "the world lacks institutions
552
capable of imposing their decisions on sovereign national governments."
In the face of a national calamity and local agitation, world bodies can do
very little to restore unfriendly international policies.
Eventually,
international institutions may at the most "authorize the use of force-553
military or economic-to coerce national compliance" with their policies.
"At best, military threats and economic sanctions are marginally effective at
influencing domestic policies . .

.

. Even the [WTO] and its elaborate

Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) has not altered this basic
structure. 554 The established international obligations of the WTO may
"authorize retaliation or [penalties] for violations," 555 but the WTO cannot
execute demands for payment of penalties and the "existing international
mechanisms to enforce such obligations may prove ineffective." 556 "[T]he
WTO has no authority or mechanism to impose the requirements of [the
dispute settlement] reports within non-compliant member states." 557 For
example, the WTO could not force India to pass the Patents Amendment
Bill nor satisfactorily implement the first amendment.558 The world
institutions can do very little amidst a public health crisis like in South
550. For example, Foster's work was awarded the prestigious Benjamin Aaron award for
best comment published in a UCLA journal in 1997-98. Foster, supra note 232, at 230.
551. Joshua D. Sarnoff, SarnoffResponse to Caldwell: A "World Law" Without Agreement
on Environmental Values?, 10 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 251, 253 (1999).

552.
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.
558

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 253-54.
Id. at 254.
Id.
See supra Part III.B.
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Africa, or local unrest like in Argentina,559 or even isolation like
Afghanistan's erstwhile Taliban.
2.

The Terror Angle

Before the war on terrorism began, developed nations needed virtually
nothing from developing nations, while the economies of developing
nations depended heavily on trade with developed nations. The war on
terrorism has forced a symbiotic relationship between the developed and the
developing nations. 56 Developed nations need the help of developing
countries like India, Pakistan, and even underdeveloped nations like
Somalia to fight the war on terror successfully. This has added one
important limitation to the alternatives available for developed nations.
Developed nations can no longer wield the trade sanction stick as
effectively. This exemplifies the need of the developed nations to
understand third world realities in policy making.
Therefore, the emphasis has moved towards strategizing practically. For
the first time, developing nations seem to have the luxury of bargaining
power. The developing nations are looking at this as a great opportunity to
prosper economically. This leaves the developed nations with the need to
avoid hostility with developing nations.
This adds pressure to the
developed nations to ensure that policies propounded for developing nations
are practical enough to lead to economic solutions.
D.

FutureStrategies

Unlike the popular theory, the divide between developing and developed
nations is hardly ideological.
Every country wants to improve
economically. The developing countries are no exception. Developing
countries would never want to shun the gains of capitalism and the
infrastructure of the developed nations. However, realities in developing
countries demand trading of social justice for economic needs. The issues
underlining the developing nations are unique and must be addressed for
world progress.

559. See supra notes 541-543 and accompanying text; see also Matt Moffett & Michelle
Wallin, Argentina Picks PeronistDuhalde as Fifth Presidentin Two Weeks, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2,
2002, at A3.
560. See supra Part IVI1. For example, in an effort to keep poorer nations on their side in
the war on terrorism, United States and European negotiators made big concessions reflecting
the new realties of the post September 11, 2001 world. Id.
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Developed nations need to efficiently balance policies to maintain their
stature internationally. Global intellectual property should accommodate
individual nations to create a level playing field. 56 1 Developing countries
have to be inducted beneficially into the trade and intellectual property
systems through economic development. 562 Economic development can be
facilitated by addressing individual concerns of nations ranging from
prosperity of the nation and density of disease, to the accessibility 56of3
infrastructure to the people. The Convention on Biological Diversity
as a mechanism to transfer technology for economic
may be used
development.5 64 It can lead to metamorphosis of the legal, economic, and
political structures of developing countries, which is vital to economic
growth. 565 Economic development will boost industries to seek intellectual
property protection.
The embracing of copyright laws by the Indian computer industry is an
Once the Indian computer industry realized its global
example.
competence, it canvassed the government for intellectual property
legislation. 566 In time, the drug industries will also follow the path of the
computer industry. The development of an indigenous drug industry
stimulated the reduction of price control in India, proving that restrictions
will be reduced if core issues are tackled. Even multi-national drug
industries could have prospered in developing countries by negotiating a
fair price at the outset. A practical understanding of both the per capita
income and the lack of insurance 567 would have enabled the chartering of a
viable strategy. A strategy of improving manufacturing and distribution

561. Gail Wilensky, who ran the Medicare system in the last Bush administration and an
adviser to a number of Republican Members of the Congress, suggests rolling back patent
protection as a free market alternative to price controls. Replying to the outcry on drug prices,
she responded that the United States needs to "rethink whether we are in exactly the right
balance point on intellectual property rights." Alan Murray, Drug Makers' Battle is One Over
Ideas, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2001, at Al.
562. Gana, supra note 13, at 737-38.
563. UN Conf. on Env't & Dev.: Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 818 (1992).
564. Srividhya Ragavan, The Global South as the Key to Biodiversity and Biotechnology-A
Reply to Professor Chen, 32 ENVIR. L. REP. 10,358, 10,359 (2001); see also Srividhya Ragavan,
Protection Of TraditionalKnowledge, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 32-35 (2001).
565. Ragavan, Global South, supra note 564, at 10,359.
566. A.K. Chakravarti, Protecting Proprietary and Security Rights in Cyberspace:
Initiatives in India, Indian Department of Elections, at http://www.unesco.org/webworld/
infoethics-21eng/papers/paperl 5.rtf (last visited Mar. 17, 2003). The computer industry in India
aided the government in amending the copyright legislation to suit industrial needs. Id.
567. See generally, Heinz Redwood, NEW HORIZONS IN INDIA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT PROTECTION 17 (1994).
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networks would have contributed to the economy and probably generated
acceptance by the people.
Developed nations should grant concessions to poor countries when
bargaining for patent protection when realistically possible. Developed
nations have a stronger bargaining position for thorough implementation of
patent laws in other areas, provided the pharmaceuticals issue is realistically
assessed. The alternative of introducing developing countries into the
intellectual property regime on a subject matter basis should be
examined.568
VI.

CONCLUSION

Developed nations need to understand that polices advocated by them
should enable third-world governments to confidently argue the cases of
international advocates with people.
This will not happen unless
international policies are poised to secure national benefits. Otherwise, it is
impossible for governments, however pressured, to successfully implement
a policy along the lines of the current TRIPS patent policy. Developed
nations need to carefully shun policies with potential to backfire on them.
The failure of drug patent policy necessitates a greater appreciation of
relevant issues. There is a heightened need to balance uniformity in policies
with individual countries' needs. Equality amongst unequals cannot be
achieved with the "stroke of a policy." Patent policies should trace a
futuristic path, lead nations towards a trade-oriented system, and not create
discontentment.
The post-World War globe makes it easier for
discontentment in obscure comers of the world to affect the rest of the
world in ways that sets the clock back by several decades. Hence, policies
need to cater to global realities. An unwise policy can unnecessarily upset
the trade regime that the developed nations have meticulously perfected.

568. See Chakravarthi Ragavan, UNCTAD Warns of Political Backlash to Globalization,
TWN Third World Network, at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/ack-cn.htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2002).

